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ABSTRACT
In many economic systems, participants are unable to internalize social costs.
These can be anything from pollution to default risk in financial systems. To deal
with these costs, regulators impose limits on the behavior of market participants.
These regulations do not always have straightforward effects, and for new regulations
a model is required to evaluate them. In this thesis I will perform this modeling
task in several domains using a computational agent-based approach. This approach
affords two advantages. First, agent-based models can handle intricate models of
participant behavior. This is often necessary when participants are operating in
a complex domain, using large modeling and computational resources of their own.
Second, agent-based models combined with empirical game theoretic analysis (EGTA)
can calculate Nash equilibria under new regulations. This addresses in part the
Lucas critique of models with regulation, which stipulates that agents can adapt
their behavior in ways that break fixed assumptions about agent behavior.
I evaluate the overall effects of regulation using metrics appropriate to each domain
I study. Using two models of the financial system, one based on an asset market and
one based on a debt market, I study Basel regulations which have been criticized for
being too simplistic and for actually being counterproductive. I find that in fact,
when accounting for the strategic adaptations of banks, Basel regulations are largely
beneficial for financial stability. I then examine recent EPA regulations that allow
the trading of emissions credits in an attempt to bring down the cost of reducing
emissions. I find that while the cost of reducing pollution is reduced as desired, costs
to consumers are increased by firms that use emissions trading to coordinate price
x





Markets are the primary way our society allocates goods and services. But when
a market fails to achieve acceptable social outcomes, governments are called upon to
modify the rules of engagement. In some cases, these regulations achieve their inten-
tions and become standard. An example of this is American bank deposit insurance
implemented by the FDIC. During the Great Depression, it became clear that bank
runs were a result of strategic behavior by depositors. Each individual’s withdrawal
of deposits made it more likely that the bank would default, making it rational for
all individuals to withdraw their funds at once in response to bad financial news.
This was a self-fulfilling prophecy as banks with no deposits were almost guaranteed
to go out of business. Regulators proposed deposit insurance, which stipulated that
deposits would be guaranteed by the government. This changed the incentives of de-
positors; since they would get their deposits back either way, they no longer felt the
collective need to withdraw all deposits, which kept he banks in business when there
was bad news. Most importantly, the deposit insurance never actually had to be paid!
This was intended, as the government could not afford to pay much deposit insurance
during the Depression. Changing the strategic calculus of market participants using
regulation is an effective, and sometimes necessary, way of ensuring markets operate
smoothly.
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However, the strategic response of economic agents is not always straightforward
to predict. Modern markets consist of sophisticated agents interacting in a complex
environment. When these markets fail, new models are required to explain what
went wrong and suggest the best policy response. But governments are compelled
to respond with lawmaking immediately, to the best of their ability. The problem
with this urgency is that if market participants adapt to new rules in surprising ways,
the regulatory response becomes at best obsolete and at worst actively harmful. A
prominent example is that of the Phillips curve model, which predicted that high
inflation would lead to low unemployment. Stimulus in many countries was rolled out
in the 1970s with this model in mind. But instead of the economic growth predicted
by the Phillips curve, the surprising development of stagflation, a stagnant economy
with high inflation, came about as a result of firms decreasing hiring due to higher
expected prices. Thus when strategic adaptations by market participants are not
anticipated correctly, amendments to the original policy fix become necessary, which
themselves may not be well understood by current economic models. Without the
ability to predict strategic response, regulators are left constantly playing catch-up
to past mistakes.
Even a partial understanding of how market participants respond strategically
to regulation can help break this cycle. I advocate a computational agent-based
approach to modeling markets and understanding the impact of regulation. This
allows for models with an increased ability to handle complex agents and markets,
compared with analytically-tractable models. To ensure that I am taking the strategic
behavior of these agents into account, I use empirical game-theoretic analysis
(EGTA), a framework for gaining deeper insights into the strategic adaptations of











































Figure 1.1: Illustration of the components of an agent-based model.
1.1 Agent-based models and methods
The central tool I use in my analysis of markets is the agent-based model , which
models economic systems by simulating the behavior of many individual agents. In
these models, agents are given the task of optimizing their payoffs by choosing
actions . The market mechanism processes these actions, adds stochasticity, and
publishes agent states and a market state . These states, when input to a payoff
function , determine payoffs for each agent. An overall view of how these two pro-
cesses interact is given in Figure 1.1. One can run an agent-based model by following
the figure, starting with a state history and ending with new market and agent
states. The new states are added to the state history , and the process iterates.
This act of iterating represents the passage of time, and thus we call each iteration a
period .
Dynamic models approximate persistent markets where agents update their de-
cisions over time. In these markets, agents adapt their actions to states revealed to
them by the market mechanism in past periods. The information encoded by these
states include:
1. Realized randomness from the market clearing process.
2. The effect of agent actions on market state outcomes.
3. The effect of agent actions on agent state outcomes.
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Depending on the modeled economic scenario, any or all of these historically
realized variables can be input into an agent’s strategy as data. A strategy is set
once and for all by an agent before the first period of running the model, and specifies
how agents translate state histories into actions that can be submitted to the market
mechanism. The set of all possible strategies is called the strategy space . This set
is constructed by the modeler and can, in general, be different for each agent. A pure
strategy profile consists of the strategies that are followed by each agent through
a complete run of the model. It is an N -tuple, with an entry indexed by i consisting
of a single member of agent i’s strategy space.
The other process in an agent-based model is the market mechanism, whose main
function is to translate the actions of agents into states, which in turn set payoffs.
The market mechanism may contain parameters that can be used to emulate different
types of economic environments. For example, a noise parameter might specify the
size of a typical stochastic shock to output states, representing volatility level in a
market. The market mechanism can use information from the state history, most
commonly historical market states, to produce new states. This dependence stems
from the fact that market mechanisms include regulations that attempt to achieve
some goal on market states. Regulators may periodically measure historical market
states to inform how stringent future regulations should be.
Figure 1.1 is abstract in that it does not depict how each individual agent’s actions
lead to an eventual payoff. In fact, the agent-based models in this thesis share the
property that any agent’s actions can affect any other agent’s payoff through any of
the market mechanism’s output states. Since agents follow strategies that process
historical states to decide on actions, this means a particular agent’s choices directly
affects the actions taken by other agents, which in turn affect the original agent
and its payoffs. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that agents consider the
strategic impact they may have on the pool of agents when committing to a strategy.
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Accounting for this strategic behavior leads us to the original economic insights in
this thesis.
The first step towards capturing important strategic behavior is the specification
of a strategy space. Sometimes there are actual strategies that are known and widely
employed in the market we are studying. Populating the strategy space with these
is usually a good idea, as it anchors the resulting analysis and often gives a flavor
of real strategic tensions that exist in the market. In general, we want to devise a
strategy space that provides agents a diverse set of options corresponding to different
ways that they may impact their short and long term payoffs. When we solve for
which strategic profiles payoff-seeking agents prefer using (methodology explained in
Section 1.2), this results in a clear economic story of how the balancing of strategic
tensions leads to an overall economic outcome in the model.
1.2 Equilibrium and empirical game-theoretic analysis
The outcome of an agent-based model is highly sensitive to the combination of
strategies chosen by agents. Recall that this is a decision agents must make at the
beginning of the model. Their payoffs, and thus their choice of strategy, depends on
the strategies chosen by all other agents. How should agents approach this complex
decision?
The entire dynamic agent-based model can be understood as a function mapping
pure strategy profiles into payoffs for each agent. This function defines a game that
agents are playing. While models require a pure strategy profile as input, an agent
is not limited to choosing a single strategy in this game. Instead, it may randomize
over its strategy space in pursuit of better payoffs, only choosing a single strategy
once the simulated model begins. This randomized strategy selection is a mixed
strategy , which is a distribution over an agent’s strategy space, corresponding to
the probabilities that the agent will pick each member of the space for use over a
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run of the model. A collection of mixed strategies, one for each agent, constitutes a
mixed strategy profile .
A mixed strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can increase their
expected payoff by deviating to a different mixed strategy. A Nash equilibrium is
always guaranteed to exist, but may be hard to compute [19]. This computational
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the agent-based models used in this thesis
require a multi-step procedure to go from a particular strategy profile to a payoff. A
further complication is that the market mechanism contains stochasticity, so payoffs
may be different for different runs of the model for the same strategy profile.
EGTA is a suite of tools that automates the process of finding Nash equilibria
in agent-based models [10]. Given black-box access to an agent-based model and a
discrete set of strategies, it selects the necessary strategy profiles that must have their
payoffs evaluated in order to find an equilibrium. It then schedules simulations to
evaluate these payoffs. When payoffs are stochastic, multiple simulations for each
profile will be scheduled and an average payoff will be evaluated. The total number
of profiles is exponential in the number of strategies as well as the number of agents
in the model, so EGTA offers tools to reduce the number of profiles sampled. One
technique is called deviation-preserving reduction [70]. This allows the modeler
to specify how many reduced players to use. The number of profiles to evaluate
decreases to be commensurate with this number instead of actual number of players,
at the cost of no longer being able to find exact equilibria. This is effective when
the number of players in the game is large. Another technique is to first check for
equilibria in subgames that are played with a subset of the full strategy set. This is
called quiescing and can be effective for games with a large amount of strategies
but which have equilibria in a small subset.
Once enough payoffs have been simulated, EGTA uses replicator dynamics to find
an equilibrium to the game [59]. This equilibrium becomes our prediction for how
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agents choose strategies in a specified regulatory environment, and the question of
how regulations might trigger strategic adaptations is addressed.
1.3 Summary of contributions
Recall that the regulator’s problem in setting policies for markets is that it is
difficult to predict the strategic response of market participants. I address this diffi-
culty by first building dynamic agent-based models that provide strategic flexibility
to agents. I then use EGTA to predict how agents given this flexibility might respond
to regulation. This helps to circumvent the game of catch-up that happens when
strategic behavior does not inform regulation.
A significant portion of this thesis analyzes financial markets. I was originally
motivated by the fact that the 2008 financial crisis did not result in any philosophical
changes in regulation. Rather, the same Basel regulatory guidelines were preserved,
and made more stringent. This poses the interesting economic question of whether
these more stringent regulatory requirements will motivate financial institutions into
behavior that leads to better social outcomes. Novel insights into how agents in the
financial system adapt strategically have real-world policy implications, and demon-
strate how economic analysis of regulations may be able to catch up to real regulated
markets.
The second market we study is the automobile market. This market consists
of several interrelated products produced by a few manufacturers. This leads to
an oligopoly market structure where pricing or production quantity decisions made
for each product, by each firm, affects the decisions made by every other firm and
product combination. It is analytically intractable to solve for an equilibrium given
this market structure, so we must develop a computational approach even for an
unregulated market. Adding regulatory constraints only makes this approach more
salient. We develop a strategic model of this market that can be used to evaluate the
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effect of emissions regulations on consumers and firms.
The overall goal of building an agent-based model and applying EGTA to analyze
the impact of regulation can be broken down into three stages: defining a modeling
framework, building a model, and applying EGTA. My work in this thesis focuses
on the appropriate stage(s) given context and existing work, but all three stages are
represented. A summary and guide to this thesis is provided below.
1. An extended analysis of an existing agent-based model of financial markets in
Chapter II. The existing model predicted that regulations introduced after the
2008 crisis would lead to financial instability. I identify a possible strategic
response to regulation in this model. I use EGTA to calculate equilibria that
account for this response, with and without regulation. In the new regulated
equilibrium, more funds stay out of default and banks lose less capital, revers-
ing the findings of the original study. Presented at the ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation 2017 [13].
2. A framework for representing and analyzing network structure in financial mar-
kets, called financial credit networks (FCNs) in Chapter III. I define this
framework and develop algorithms that make it possible to represent financial
contracts and route payments [12]. FCNs make it possible to build models
where the ramifications of local credit events are felt globally, which will be key
to my work in Chapter IV. Presented at the ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation 2016.
3. An FCN-based model of interbank debt formation, used to analyze the effect of
debt market dynamics on financial stability in Chapter IV. This model repro-
duces several important systemic risks endogenously from profit-seeking bank
behavior. These risks have previously only been studied in static networks. At
equilibrium, Basel is able to reduce systemic risk significantly despite having
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access to only aggregated balance sheet data (as opposed to metrics based on
the network structure between banks). A preliminary version of this model was
presented at the AI3 workshop during AAMAS 2018 [14].
4. An investigation of how automobile manufacturers respond strategically to emis-
sions regulation in Chapter V. The model I use incorporates the oligopolistic
structure of the car market. This analysis revealed that emissions trading pro-
vides a clear benefit to consumers and producers of cars, but that producers
benefit disproportionately by using the trading platform to coordinate price
increases. Presented at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence 2019 [11].
1.4 Possible extensions
The most obvious extension to this work is a continuation of modeling the bank-
ing system using EFCNs. While my model produces (qualitatively) some important
features of the 2008 crisis, the degree to which the evaluated model settings in Chap-
ter IV match data from the crisis is unknown. There are also many real-life parties
that are not modeled, such as firms in the real economy and homeowners. EFCNs
allow the modeling of dynamic debt relations between these parties, which may illu-
minate further the ways in which banking sector collapse affects the real economy.
EFCNs themselves may also be extended to include other types of financial re-
lationships. For instance, shared ownership of assets (i.e., equity) is a major way
in which participants in modern economies invest in each other, that is abstracted
away by necessity in my credit cycle model due to its absence from EFCNs. In ad-
dition, nodes in an EFCN have no ability to influence each other through non-debt
investment activities, and cannot liquidate their debt through a market. These are all
important features of the real banking system that could be added to a new modeling
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framework.
In my work on EPA regulations, I have assumed a fixed technological profile. In
reality, both gas and electric engine technologies are advancing rapidly, and it would
be informative to evaluate different scenarios that include these advances. This could
be handled with minimal changes to the modeling framework, but would require
carefully selected scenarios that are preferably based on data.
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CHAPTER II
Banking regulation and the leverage cycle
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis in 2008 marked a seismic shift in perceptions of how markets
operate, and its reverberations are still being felt in debt markets around the world
[61]. Our understanding of how financial crises arise time and again in the midst of
sophisticated and logically motivated actors is still incomplete. After an initial rush
in academic circles to develop new economic models to reflect forensic evidence from
the crash, and to recommend regulation to prevent future crashes, we have been left
with a plethora of different viewpoints.
One approach that has gained influence even in crisis-unrelated research [31] fo-
cuses on the fact that buyers and sellers do not have the same access to information
about assets, especially in the context of debt markets. Based on this asymmetry,
Bernanke et al. [6] showed that periodic, deep financial crashes are endemic due to
an overreaction to interest rate changes. The recommendation is clear: force sellers
to be more transparent about their wares. Almost everyone agrees that making more
information available is a good policy, and regulators commonly work towards this
goal.
There are many other convincing perspectives on the crisis. The irrational exu-
berance [62] narrative posits a deep behavioral reason for market malfunction. It is
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also popular to point to systemic factors, like lax lending standards and oversight,
leading to market participants whose priorities move away from the proper valua-
tion of assets [15]. Another body of work points to the seizure of credit markets
at the most critical juncture of the crisis for amplifying the crisis. This failure has
been attributed to either too much refinancing during normal times [55], or a run
on liquidity [33] in response to financial panic. Agent-based simulations elaborating
on traditional economic models have also been used. Bookstaber et al. [7] introduce
one where agents have fixed fire-sale behavior, and the spread of the crisis can sub-
sequently be measured through different pathways. All of these models can explain
some aspects of the financial crisis, and suggest various emphases for macroeconomic
policy and regulation.
However, given the complexity of the financial system it is difficult to draw con-
clusions directly from underlying causes for ideal policies. An alternative perspective
is to start from the policies, and model the situations where they are beneficial or
harmful. I take this perspective in this chapter, focusing on international banking
regulations in the Basel framework . Basel’s salience follows from its central role
in global financial policy, and its force in governing the lending policies of major
financial institutions.
Basel regulations consist chiefly of a limit to leverage , or the ratio of gross in-
vestment to wealth (capital for banks). By taking on debt, banks can make this
ratio arbitrarily large if unregulated by investing on credit. An institution with high
leverage cannot pay its obligations if its investments underperform even slightly, so
it seems natural that limiting leverage may help control default risk. The fact that
leverage levels turned out to predict the financial crisis better than interest rates
evidences the centrality of this variable to financial stability.1 Regulator belief in
limiting leverage is so strong that their most prominent operational regulation after
1A study by Geanakoplos et al. [26] established a link between financial crashes and leverage
levels that successfully predicted data from 2.2 million American households.
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the crisis was to simply implement a stricter version of Basel. But as such policies
had failed to immunize the financial system, there is some uncertainty about how
much the stricter version will help in the future.
The leverage cycle model of Geanakoplos [24] describes the ebb and flow of
leverage, shedding light on how aggregate leverage may increase to dangerous levels.
Importantly, the model endogenizes leverage, showing how it evolves through agent
decision making. Several key predictions made by this model were borne out by
asset behavior during the crisis. First, price fluctuations were disproportionate to
fundamental value changes. Second, the failure of a few highly leveraged investors
had an outsize impact on prices. Third, the severe tightening of short term credit
markets contributed to a deeper crash. All of these predictions were entailed by the
model, with leverage choices at Walrasian equilibrium under perfect information.
While the model of Geanakoplos [24] has the advantage of being fully analytical,
it extended only to three periods and thus could not accommodate changing finan-
cial regulation over time. In a discrete agent-based extension to the leverage cycle
model, Thurner et al. [64] and Poledna et al. [52] introduced a Basel-style regula-
tor that imposes a leverage limit on financial firms. As in the latest round of Basel
financial regulations, the leverage limit in the model is more stringent in times of
high asset price volatility. Using this model, Poledna et al. [52] argue that Basel
regulations could, counter to their purpose, contribute to financial instability. In
their model under certain settings, market participants (or funds) defaulted more
frequently and produced more volatile asset prices when a Basel-based leverage limit
was implemented. Market participants also made less profit. However, funds that
defaulted were of a smaller size, so the cost per default decreased. A follow-up study
by Aymanns and Farmer [3] suggests that an inverted Basel regulation would be more
effective at preventing financial crises.
My contribution is to observe that a certain fixed assumption in these models,
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the aggression distribution , might naturally be considered a strategic choice by
agents. I extend the model of Poledna et al. [52] to a game, where the agents strate-
gically choose their aggression level in response to the regulation regime. I employ
simulation-based methods to analyze this game, identifying aggression distributions
that are in approximate Nash equilibrium. Using this approach, I reverse in aggre-
gate the finding that Basel causes more defaults. Losses that are due to default
decrease further, and agent profits decrease less. The overall case against Basel is
thus weakened by my findings.
In Section 2.2, I describe the model used by Poledna et al. [52], and explain
the effect of Basel regulations on the leverage cycle in this model. I also describe
implementation details and assumptions used in the original work that carry over into
my independent implementation. In Section 2.3, I argue that agent aggression levels in
this model should be treated as strategic variables. I propose an approach to analyze
the strategic adaptations of agent aggression using Nash equilibrium, while continuing
to clear markets in each period, using prices. Finally, I design an experiment that
distinguishes the effect of Basel on the leverage cycle for a fixed set of agents (studied
in previous work) from its effect in equilibrium, due to strategic adaptations of agents.
I measure the effect of Basel on financial stability by looking at default rate, agent
profits, capital losses, and price volatility. The strategic adaptation of agents on
its own improves every measure except price volatility, which remains unchanged.
In aggregate, I find that Basel decreases default rate and capital losses, while also
decreasing agent profits and increasing price volatility.
2.2 An agent-based model of the leverage cycle
Following Poledna et al. [52], we adopt and extend the basic leverage cycle model
of Geanakoplos [25]. This model has been credited with predicting characteristics
of the 2008 financial crisis years in advance. By treating leverage as an endogenous
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decision, it characterizes equilibrium in financial markets in terms of leverage taken
by each agent, in addition to the asset price, and the interest rate on debt. Since Basel
targets leverage as a policy variable, the leverage cycle model seems like a natural
candidate for evaluating recent financial regulation.
However, the original leverage cycle model is limited in its ability to express real-
world complexity. For example, it cannot be extended for an arbitrary number of
periods, and short asset positions are not considered. Basel regulation, since it re-
sponds to the historical volatility of asset prices, is not easily incorporated. To address
such issues, Poledna et al. [52] develop a discrete agent-based model (ABM). At a
high level, this model clears the market in each period for persistent financial agents.
Agents carry over their wealth to each new period, where demand undergoes a ran-
dom shock and new prices are formed. Basel regulation is easily expressed in this new
model since a regulator may act in each period with knowledge of historical prices.
The flip side is that agents are no longer coming to an intertemporal equilibrium as
in the leverage cycle model. But leverage remains an endogenous decision by each
market participant.
2.2.1 Agent-based model
Poledna et al. [52] include four types of agent, who interact in a market for a sin-
gle risky asset. The asset has an unchanging fundamental value , V , and a market
price p(t) at time t, determined by the cumulative demand of all agents. The central
actors are informed value investors called fund managers . Fund managers know
the fundamental value and adjust their demand for the asset based on a mispricing
signal m = V − pt. The fund managers exhibit heterogeneous demand as a function
of m, reflecting their differing levels of aggression in pursuing investment oppor-
tunities. The more aggressive a fund is, the more leverage it will take to pursue a
given mispricing signal. Aggression reflects factors such as a fund’s confidence that
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the asset price will return to its fundamental in short order, and its tolerance for risk.
A fund manager that buys an asset while it is priced under its fundamental is betting
that the price will move back up and make her a profit.
To buy or short-sell assets, fund managers may take loans from the bank , treated
as an agent in the ABM of Poledna et al. [52]. The bank provides credit to funds
but requires a set amount of collateral per unit debt. In effect, this collateral
requirement imposes a leverage limit . To see this, consider how a leveraged investor
keeps her books. She knows that to borrow a dollar from the bank she must commit
some amount of wealth as collateral. Call this collateral requirement X. But she only
has so much wealth, W , to commit in total. Thus there is a maximum amount she
can borrow, W/X, which is constant given W . The ratio of this maximum amount to
her current wealth is 1/X. If the bank decides to increase X, it effectively decreases
the leverage limit. In practice, we refer to the bank setting a leverage limit without
relating explicitly to collateral. In general, the investor is taking on debt in order to
take a larger investment position, which she is free to do until she is over the leverage
limit. Then she must wind down her investment position and reduce her debt until
she is in compliance with the bank.
Thus, in any given time period, funds are limited in the size of the asset position
they can take, either long or short, in response to asset mispricings. Note that
the bank may be forced to take losses when fund managers default. These losses are
recorded but the bank itself never defaults, as it is assumed that there is an unlimited
bailout fund.
Mispricings are made possible by stochastic, weakly mean-reverting asset demand
from aptly named noise traders . The noise traders represent a collection of ill-
informed investors. Their collective behavior exerts a random shock to total asset
demand, which in turn shifts the market-clearing asset price.
The final agent type is the fund investor . The fund investor’s role is simply to
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move capital from fund managers with poor (historical) performance, toward those
with good performance.
2.2.2 The leverage cycle and Basel: intuition
It is easy to see that without any limits on leverage, the price of the asset would
always return to its fundamental value, as funds would just increase their position
against the direction of the shock until the mispricing disappears. It requires just one
fund able to take unlimited size positions on the asset to ensure that there is never
any price volatility around V . But with leverage limits, the system exhibits complete
leverage cycles over time. The qualitative steps to the cycle are shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Stages of the leverage cycle modeled by Poledna et al. [52].
When shocks are small enough, wealth in the system becomes more and more
concentrated in the most aggressive funds as they take more effective leverage in
pursuing mispricing opportunities. This gradually increases the sensitivity of total
wealth in the system to random price shocks until some investors reach their leverage
limit. At that point, a decrease in the asset price would push the leverage ratio over
the limit,2 and so the investor would be forced to sell to get back in compliance when
she would actually rather be buying the asset. This action is procyclical , since the
2For example, consider the investor with $1 who borrows $5 to buy assets worth $6. Her leverage
ratio is currently 6. If the asset value decreases to $5.5, the investor still owes $5 to the bank, so
her wealth is now $0.5. Her leverage ratio increases to 11, which may be out of compliance with the
bank.
17
act of selling further depresses the price, which can lead to further deleveraging by
other funds. It may even induce a mass sell-off (or buy-off for short positions), as
other, formerly less leveraged funds struggle to satisfy the leverage limit due to the
acceleration of the price movement against their positions. Eventually, enough funds
have either defaulted or deleveraged that collectively, they have become insensitive
to further price movements, and the cycle begins again. Price volatility, probability
of investor default, and losses on defaulted loans are all elevated due to this leverage
cycle.
Within this model we can also incorporate Basel-style regulation, which makes
leverage limits more stringent during periods of high volatility, and less stringent
otherwise. Under fixed fund behavior, this increases the probability that investors
get into procyclical situations, since the leverage limits themselves will adapt to be
procyclical. Intuitively, higher leverage limits in volatile times could allow funds to
provide a voice of reason and return the price to the asset’s fundamental value. So
Basel, by doing the opposite, potentially makes volatility and default more likely. On
the other hand, Basel may reduce the losses suffered by the bank on defaulted loans,
since the doomed funds were forced to deleverage more quickly before their default.
My study starts by reimplementing this ABM and replicating the original results.
The remainder of this section describes model details; my extension to incorporate
strategic response is described in Section 2.3. To implement the model, I use as
references the description of Poledna et al. [52] together with code provided by these
authors in response to our queries. Unless otherwise stated, all of the following
modeling decisions and parameters are as implemented in the prior work. I attempt
to keep the model as close as possible to prior work in order to isolate the effect that
our equilibrium concept has on the evaluation of Basel policies. Assumptions were
justified in the original work by drawing parallels with real data on financial crashes.
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2.2.3 Schedule
The state of the market is defined by an equilibrium asset price and the resulting
holdings and debt levels of the fund managers. The agent-based simulation iterates
between a price formation phase and a wealth update phase. I describe these phases
at a high level below to give a sense of the scheduling of tasks.
Price formation
1. The demand from each fund manager is a fixed function of the mispricing signal
and the fund’s current wealth. These demand functions depend on the maxi-
mum leverage allowed by banks as well as the fund’s idiosyncratic aggression
parameter.
2. Noise traders demand the asset according to a stochastic process such that
without fund managers, the asset price would weakly mean revert around the
fundamental value of the asset (an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process). The noise
trader’s demand is what makes the mispricing signal nonzero in each period.
3. The price of the asset p(t) is set at a level that clears the market given the
collection of demand functions submitted by noise traders and fund managers.
This is a Walrasian equilibrium within period t.
Wealth update of fund managers
1. The new asset price as determined in the price-formation phase induces revised
wealth levels for each of the fund managers based on the market value of their
holdings.
2. The fund investors obtain a new datapoint regarding the profitability of each
fund manager by observing the wealth gained or lost in the update. They
withdraw or deposit capital into funds accordingly.
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3. Banks enforce leverage limits on funds. Funds that exceed leverage limits are
subject to a margin call , requiring they change their position in the asset to
comply with the limit. Note that the violation of leverage limits can be triggered
by a change in asset price, by the movement of capital by fund investors, or some
combination.
2.2.4 Basic definitions
We define the key variables describing the state of a fund h at time t.
1. Dh(t) is the amount of the asset that the fund holds at t. It may be positive,
meaning the fund owns a positive amount of the asset, or negative, indicating
a short position.
2. Mh(t) is the cash position of the fund. The cash balance is changed each period
based on purchases or sales of the asset. A negative Mh(t) indicates a debt
position.
3. The wealth of a fund is defined by
Wh(t) ≡ Dh(t)p(t) +Mh(t),
recalling that p(t) is market price of the asset. All nondefaulted funds have
Wh(t) > 0. This entails in particular that a short asset position is always
accompanied by a positive cash position.
4. The leverage taken by each firm is defined as
λh(t) ≡

Dh(t)p(t)/Wh(t) if Dh(t) ≥ 0 (long)
Mh(t)/Wh(t) if Dh(t) < 0 (short).
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Recalling that Wh(t) within a period is constant and positive, and therefore
the numerator is always positive, λh(t) ∈ [0,∞). It can in principle be made
arbitrarily large by taking a position of sufficient magnitude, although due to
leverage restrictions, the funds are constrained in the positions they can take.
These definitions allow for a fund to have short and long positions on an asset.
For a given wealth, a fund with a long position has a positive value of asset hold-
ings Dh(t)p(t) with cash Mh(t) unrestricted. A common scenario is negative Mh(t),
meaning the fund has taken on debt to finance their long position. This necessarily
makes Dh(t)p(t) > Wh(t). Thus any fund indebted to the bank must have λh(t) ≥ 1.
On the other hand, a fund with a short position owes future shares to its counter-
party (Dh(t) < 0), but holds the cash it obtained from the sale of these future shares
(Mh(t) > 0). If the price of the asset p(t) increases, the wealth of a fund that is long
on the asset goes up while the wealth of a fund that is short goes down. The opposite
occurs if p(t) decreases.
2.2.5 Regulatory environments
In the somewhat misnamed unregulated environment , λh(t) is constrained
to be less than a parameter λmax for all h. The Basel environment adaptively
selects maximum leverage λ
σ(t)
max between periods based on price volatility σ(t). λ
σ(t)
max





where σb = 0.0118 is a set benchmark level of volatility, and σ(t) is measured as
the average volatility of the log asset price in the previous 10 periods. Before 10
periods are available, all price data is used. Thus, maximum leverage requirements
are adjusted downwards in periods of high volatility and are allowed to reach λmax
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when volatility is low. In the unregulated case, λmax is still a hard limit on leverage
but it does not adapt to market conditions.
2.2.6 Fund demand
Leverage limits effectively constrain the maximum and minimum demand for each
fund manager. Individually, each fund manager h with aggression parameter βh has
a demand Dh(t) of the following form, at time t:
Dh(t) ≡

(1− λσ(t)max)Wh(t− 1)/p(t) m(t) ≤ (1− λmax)/βh
λ
σ(t)
maxWh(t− 1)/p(t) m(t) > λmax/βh
βhm(t)Wh(t− 1)/p(t) otherwise
Here the price p(t) at time t is the free variable and all other quantities are
fixed. The fundamental value is set at V = 1 and Wh(t − 1) denotes the total
wealth accumulated by h in the last period. In the original study [52], the aggression
parameter βh is fixed to be h × 5 where h ∈ {1, . . . , 10} is the index of the fund, of
which there are ten in total. In our strategic analysis we allow the funds to choose
the βh’s, but for now they are fixed. Notice that in the lower and upper regions of
price, demand does not depend on βh. In particular, demand is fixed in these regions.
This comes from the fact that funds have hit their leverage limit and cannot borrow
further to pursue investment opportunities. An example of the demand function for
two funds with different βh is shown in Figure 2.2.
2.2.7 Market clearing price
Every period, prices are used to coordinate asset allocation. Each fund submits
their demand function truthfully and an equilibrium is found after the noise traders
generate stochastic demand. Each period gets its own independent price. The only
thing that transfers information between periods is the wealth that each fund ends
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Figure 2.2: Demand as a function of mispricing. The mispricing values beyond short
saturation and long saturation on either side result in no additional demand for the
asset because leverage limits have been reached.
up holding.
Given the demand functions of all funds as well as the noise trader demand C(t),
prices are formed via the market clearing condition
∑
h
Dh(t) = N − C(t), (2.2)
where C(t) is generated by
logCn(t) = ρ logCn(t− 1) + σnχ(t) + (1− ρ) log(N).
The noise parameter σn is set to 0.035 and χ(t) is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian draw.
Parameter ρ is set to 0.99, representing extremely weak mean reversion. This is the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, a standard model in finance for asset price dynamics.
We set N = 109. Equation (2.2) is a piecewise linear function of p(t) which can
be solved using standard methods.
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2.2.8 Wealth update
Using the p(t) (recall it is embedded in the demand functions Dh(t)) obtained
as solution to (2.2), the wealth of each fund Wh(t) can now be updated. Assume
for now that Dh(t − 1) is positive, that is, fund h takes a long position. There are
three possible sources of wealth change in the model: market value of assets, interest
payments, and equity flows.
The increase in asset value for each fund is simply Dh(t− 1)[p(t)− p(t− 1)], and
reflects the return on an investment made in the previous period. This is the fund’s
profit or loss.
In general, funds finance their investment opportunities using debt from the bank.
If the amount of cash Mh(t) = Wh(t) − Dh(t)p(t) is negative, then the fund has
borrowed from the bank to buy Dh(t) shares of the asset. In this case the fund pays a
fixed interest rate S = 0.015%. After paying interest, the fund’s total available assets
for withdrawal is now
M∗h(t) = Dh(t− 1)p(t) +Mh(t− 1)(1 + S).
The other source for changes in wealth is withdrawals or deposits made by fund
investors. These make their decisions based on recent performance of each fund.
Fund investors examine each fund’s rate of return (estimated using an exponential
moving average) rh(t) and withdraw/deposit an amount Fh(t) as follows:
Fh(t) = max{−1, b(rh(t)− rb)}max{0,M∗h(t)},
where the benchmark return rb is 0.003 and b, controlling how strongly fund investors
react to historical performance, is set at 0.15. The overall motion equation for wealth
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is then
Wh(t) = Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t)− p(t− 1)] + Fh(t) +Mh(t− 1)(1 + S).
Analogously, for a short position we have
M∗h(t) = Dh(t− 1)p(t) +Mh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)S,
Wh(t) = Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t)− p(t− 1)] + Fh(t) +Dh(t− 1)p(t− 1)S.
Once all fund wealths are updated, the time step is complete and we go back to price
formation.
2.2.9 Default
Each fund starts with W0 = 2× 106 in wealth. Default occurs when wealth goes
below a critical value We = 2 × 105. In this case, the fund’s wealth, demand, and
cash positions become zero for 100 timesteps, after which the fund is resuscitated at
the same level of aggression βh and given W0 to start operations again.
2.3 Systemic risk evaluation
The motivation for using this model is to see what effect regulation can have on
the leverage cycle, and how this impacts systemic risk. We first develop an approach
for evaluating the effect of regulation when fund managers are given the opportunity
to adapt strategically according to changing external conditions. Then we define
metrics for measuring systemic risk and perform an experiment measuring the effects
of the strategic adaptations on systemic risk.
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2.3.1 Strategic aggression behavior
Recall from Section 2.2.6 that each fund is assigned an aggression level. We
call these assignments the aggression distribution . Poledna et al. [52] assume
that the aggression distribution is fixed. This assumption is problematic for several
reasons, but fundamentally because it limits the responsiveness of fund behavior to
environmental conditions, either of the market or the regulatory system.
We focus on this assumption in particular because the entire model appears to
be highly sensitive to the aggression distribution. For example, if all funds have low
aggression then leverage will almost never be high enough to induce defaults. As
circumstantial evidence for this, in all the experiments described in Section 2.3.4, no
fund at an aggression level of 5 ever defaulted. This may be considered an extreme
setting, but it is disturbing that one can generate almost any story one wants by ma-
nipulating this fixed assumption. It is far better to derive the aggression distribution
from something more fundamental, like strategic choice.
We therefore treat aggression level as an endogenous variable, taking account of
the dependence of each fund’s payoff on the aggression of other players. That is, we
cast the entire scenario as a game played among funds, where aggression distribu-
tions are strategy profiles and the strategy set is comprised of different aggression
levels. Aggression levels are chosen by all funds simultaneously. This allows us to
search through the space of possible aggression distributions using EGTA to find a
Nash equilibrium where no fund can make more profit by changing their aggression
level. This approach, notably, leaves each fund’s aggression level (and thus demand
function) in a given period fixed. Within a given time period we still have perfect
information and complete markets, so clearing the asset market still produces a Wal-
rasian equilibrium. The only intertemporal choice funds make is aggression level,
which is chosen for all periods simultaneously. Thus our strategic analysis is limited
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to aggression levels, that is, we do not consider other strategic market behavior.3
This preserves the spirit of the leverage cycle story for a given equilibrium choice of
aggression distribution. We see below that the aggregate effect of equilibrating prices
in each period and aggression over all periods has a substantial effect on financial
stability.
2.3.2 Experimental setup
In our approach we evaluate the introduction of Basel into the model on two
dimensions. First, given a particular aggression distribution, we measure the effect
of regulatory environment on systemic risk measures. This is meant to confirm the
findings of Poledna et al. [52] by isolating the effect of Basel on the leverage cycle
model given fixed aggression levels. Second, and more novel, we look at the effect
of shifting between equilibrium aggression distributions given a particular regulatory
environment. An equilibrium aggression distribution is a Nash equilibrium induced
by a regulatory environment (i.e., Basel versus unregulated). This approach isolates
the effect of Basel on the strategic choice of aggression levels while leaving its effect
on the leverage cycle constant.
Strategies and Nash equilibrium First, some implementation details. A pure
profile in this model is an H-dimensional vector β containing a single aggression level,
or strategy, for each of H funds. For our study we chose a number of funds
H ∈ {10, 21}
and a set of 7 possible aggression levels/strategies
Γ = {5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50}
3Since funds are not atomic, there could be room for exercising market power. In our setting we
view the market as competitive enough at that level to ignore such options.
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Thus a particular fund’s mixed strategy is a 7-dimensional simplex, corresponding to
the probabilities that the fund will pick each of the seven strategies for use over the
entire simulation. A mixed strategy profile D is a probability distribution over pure
profiles. Drawing from Γ using the multinomial distribution specified by D assigns a
βh to each of the H funds.
Our goal is to use EGTA to find a D∗ that is a Nash equilibrium. To do this, we
first need to define how the game is played and how payoffs are generated.
Payoffs and game definition Each run of the model provides a ready made payoff:
the fee earned by each fund. To find this fee, we first run the model for T = 50, 000
periods using H ∈ {10, 21} funds and a given β vector representing the aggression
level for each fund. At the end of the simulation, we annualize into 1000 years
containing 50 periods each as before. In each year i starting at periods t, we calculate
the average size of fund h, Wh(i) =
∑t+50
t Wh(t)/50 as well as the profit ζh(i) =
Wh(t+50)−Wh(t)−
∑t+50
t Fh(t), which is simply the change in wealth net of investor
withdrawals and deposits over the course of the year. The fee for year i is then defined




This is the specification used by Poledna et al. [52], based on standard practice
in the financial industry. It captures the common 2-and-20 fee structure, which pays
hedge funds 2% of assets under management and 20% of value returned to investors
annually. This annualization (1000 years that are each 50 periods long) is done
according to the original paper [52], where the model was calibrated to real yearly
data. Note that the payoff for a given mixed strategy D depends on whether or not
Basel is active as well as λmax and is an average over many 50,000-period simulations
where pure profiles β are generated from D.
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Environmental settings In summary, we can view the model input as choice
of regulation R, a particular β vector of strategies representing a pure profile, and
parameter λmax. The model itself can be viewed as a black box function, mapping
to the model output which is a vector of payoffs, or fees, for each fund. In reality,
remember that payoffs are generated by relying on separate Walrasian equilibria in
each of the 50,000 periods to set prices.
Finding the Nash equilibrium distribution D∗(R, λmax) of such a system requires
searching through input β and evaluating fees until an equilibrium is found. This is
where EGTA can be used to great effect, which we do by using a suite of tools devel-
oped by Cassell and Wellman [10]. We were able to obtain approximate D∗(R, λmax)
for R ∈ {Basel ,Unregulated} and λmax ∈ {8, 20}. These levels of λmax were chosen
to reflect a wide range of conditions.
Note that I chose to show results for the same set of strategies Γ as that used
by Poledna et al. [52]. This was mainly for comparability, but I did test lower min-
imum (down to 1), higher maximum (up to 70), and a finer resolution in between
for aggression levels. I found that the results were not qualitatively different. For
example, a β of 1 was not adopted in the mixed strategy equilibrium when added
to the reported set of strategies. In all tested cases, Basel encouraged less average
aggression in equilibrium.
Empirical game-theoretic analysis The empirical game approach imposes two
major approximations. First, the set of available strategies Γ is restricted to a modest
number of enumerated choices. As noted above, I limited attention to |Γ| = 7 choices
of aggression level, following the study by Poledna et al. [52]. Since the number of
pure strategy profiles is exponential in the number of strategies, and in the worst case
EGTA will need to evaluate payoffs for all pure strategy profiles, I have no choice but
to impose such a limit. Second, for the H = 21 setting I used a technique called
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deviation preserving reduction [70], which employs aggregation to model the
21-player game in terms of a reduced six-player game.
2.3.3 Systemic risk metrics
Our metrics for systemic risk differ from those provided by Poledna et al. [52]
in one key respect. Rather than focusing on the risk of the most aggressive fund
manager, we instead evaluate risk aggregated over all fund managers. The aggregate
measure reflects a more direct evaluation of the entire economy. Moreover, as we
allow distribution of aggression to vary based on endogenous choices, we need a way
to evaluate the riskiness across situations with different maximum aggression levels.
This difference is only relevant for measuring probability of default and capital losses.4
Probability of default To calculate probability of default of a single fund for a
single run of the model, I record the agent-years during which a default occurred.
Then I divide this number by the number of agent-years during which default was
possible, Kh. Kh ≤ 1000 because defaulted funds go out of operation for 2 years, or
100 time steps, as specified in Section 2.2.3. Thus, there are entire agent-years during
which default is impossible, since the agent has already defaulted. Note that there
are also years during which default is only partially possible as the fund is still in a
defaulted state at the beginning of the year. We choose to exclude these years from




Here, recall that H is the total number of funds.
4We also calculated the original study’s metrics and verified that our implementation matched
the results reported by Poledna et al. [52].
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Capital losses to banks Capital loss is the amount of loss banks suffer when a
fund manager defaults. It is defined as the wealth Wh(t) of the defaulting fund at
default. This is an important metric for systemic risk because these losses are often
paid for through bank bailouts, which detract from social welfare.
Capital losses were measured on an annual basis, in the same way as for probability
of default. Yearly capital losses are totaled, then averaged across the number of funds
and number of years during which default was possible.
Price volatility Price volatility is detrimental to the extent it contributes to finan-
cial uncertainty. One of the functions of financial markets is efficient price discovery,
and one might hope that in a single asset market where some investors have per-
fect information about the fundamental value of the asset, this function would be
performed well. Price volatility is a good proxy for how well price discovery is per-
formed. Indeed, if we allow
∑
hDh(t) to be large compared to C(t) for all t, we would
expect price volatility to be near zero as the effect of the noise traders is minimized.
Price volatility is the average of the annual variances of p(t). This metric does not
depend on Kh like the other two, since prices can be formed regardless of the default
status of any fund.
2.3.4 Systemic risk results
Our first notable result is that in every setting evaluated, the strategy profile that
maximized total fees was for every fund to use βh = 5. This is the least aggressive
strategy available, and is the most limiting in the range of investment choices available
to the fund. The only benefit to playing this strategy is that it mitigates the leverage
cycle and may prevent crashes from happening. This is circumstantial evidence that
defaults are very harmful not only to banks and investors, but also to the funds
themselves. It also provides a basis for believing that strategy profiles with low
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aggression may be better for systemic risk.
Regulation numFunds λmax 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 βweighted
Unregulated 21 20 35% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60% 32.3
Basel 21 20 40% 12% 6% 0% 0% 0% 42% 25.3
Unregulated 21 8 32% 15% 7% 2% 0% 0% 43% 26.3
Basel 21 8 46% 11% 9% 5% 10% 15% 4% 16.7
Unregulated 10 20 46% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 49% 27.4
Basel 10 20 51% 14% 8% 0% 0% 0% 26% 18.4
Unregulated 10 8 40% 21% 8% 0% 0% 0% 31% 20.8
Basel 10 8 53% 18% 7% 1% 11% 10% 0% 13.0
Figure 2.3: Mixed-strategy symmetric equilibria for different regulatory regimes and
leverage restrictions.
Mixed strategy Nash equilibria Shown in Figure 2.3 are approximate mixed
strategy Nash equilibria for each of 8 environmental settings. Also shown are βweighted ,
which are the average values of βh drawn from each mixed strategy profile. Notice
that decreasing λmax and imposing Basel both decrease the βweighted of the Nash
equilibrium. When Basel is imposed, it is no longer as lucrative for funds to be
aggressive since they will reach their leverage limits immediately. Decreasing λmax
has a similar effect. This strategic response has ramifications on our systemic risk
measures.
Interestingly, all equilibria are far from the social optimum. This is because it
takes coordination to prevent defaults and maximize profits. Unilaterally playing a
less aggressive strategy has positive externalities, namely a lower default rate and
crash rate for all agents, that are not internalized by fund payoffs.
Systemic risk under equilibria When Basel is imposed on a previously unregu-
lated market, two things happen in equilibrium. First, the mechanics of fund behav-
ior change as their leverage limits become more stringent in volatile periods. Second,
funds adapt their aggression to fit the regulation, shifting to less aggresive (on av-
erage) Nash equilibria over mixed strategies as in Figure 2.3. To evaluate these two
effects on financial stability, we first select a mixed strategy equilibrium. Next, we
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take 200 draws from the distribution. Each draw is a valid strategy profile. We cal-
culate the metrics from Section 2.3.3 on each of these 200 strategy profiles both with
and without Basel. The averages are presented in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.4.
↑ Volatility ↑ Volatility
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 0.0222 0.0182 Basel 0.0338 0.0205







λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 3.67% 2.99% Basel 1.43% 2.20%
Unregulated 5.02% 3.73% Unregulated 3.11% 3.55%
↓ Capital Loss ↓ Capital Loss
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 2.66E+06 3.42E+06 Basel 5.45E+05 2.13E+06
Unregulated 3.21E+06 3.88E+06 Unregulated 9.15E+05 2.76E+06
↓ Fees ↓ Fees
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 1.80E+05 1.90E+05 Basel 1.43E+05 2.03E+05





































Figure 2.4: Three systemic risk metrics evaluated at two levels of λmax for 21 funds.
Analagous table for 10 funds in Figure 2.5. Within a table, each row fixes an equi-
librium mixed strategy and applies a different regulatory setting, each column fixes
a regulatory setting and switches to a different mixed strategy equilibrium. Down
arrows signify that the metric decreased when Basel was applied in the study by
Poledna et al. [52] while up arrows signify that the metric increased. Blue lettering
means changing that property results in a metric change that agrees with Poledna
et al. [52] while red means changing that property results in a metric change that goes
against their finding. Black means that there was no significant change in the variable.
Example: For λmax = 20’s default probability table, up arrow means that Poledna
et al. [52] found Basel increased default probability. Fixing profiles and changing
settings agrees with this finding, indicating successful replication, while fixing setting
and changing profiles goes against this finding.
Each table shows two-dimensional variation across regulatory environments. Along
rows, we keep the mixed strategy equilibrium fixed and change the environment.
Along columns, we keep the regulatory setting fixed and change the equilibrium. For
every metric and setting we tested, shifting between Basel and unregulated envi-
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↑ Volatility ↑ Volatility
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 0.0232 0.0188 Basel 0.0317 0.0205







λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 2.24% 2.11% Basel 0.52% 1.35%
Unregulated 4.17% 3.65% Unregulated 1.23% 2.46%
↓ Capital Loss ↓ Capital Loss
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 1.43E+06 2.24E+06 Basel 3.09E+05 1.41E+06
Unregulated 1.91E+06 2.79E+06 Unregulated 3.52E+05 1.56E+06
--- Fees ↓ Fees
λmax = 20 Basel Unregulated λmax = 8 Basel Unregulated
Basel 4.25E+05 4.34E+05 Basel 3.48E+05 4.63E+05





































Figure 2.5: 10 funds. See Figure 2.4 for key.
ronments under a fixed equilibrium resulted in the same effect on the metric as that
reported by Poledna et al. [52]. This should not be surprising since with a fixed aggres-
sion distribution, I am essentially repeating their experiment with slightly different
aggression settings. This is essentially just confirmation that we have a successful
replication.
Something interesting happens when we examine these tables along columns. This
is equivalent to fixing the regulatory environment and switching between mixed strat-
egy equilibria. We have already seen that the average βh for Basel equilibria is sub-
stantially lower. It turns out that less aggressive funds increase financial stability
by decreasing the probability of default and bank capital losses. For example, at
λmax = 20, even though Basel makes default more likely for a fixed aggression dis-
tribution, the shift towards the Basel equilibrium counteracts and reverses this effect
for both H = 10 and H = 21.
In aggregate, the story has changed. Basel decreases probability of default in
every measured case. Capital losses, which were already decreasing in the original
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study, decrease even further. Price volatility still increases with Basel, since the shift
in equilibrium did not have an effect. Fees are lower in the Basel setting, but by less
than was predicted by Poledna et al. [52]. Shifting between equilibria increases fees
in most cases to cancel out some of the fee loss found in the original study.
2.3.5 Discussion
So what explains Basel’s performance in decreasing systemic risk? We can break
this question into two parts. First, how does Basel allow less aggressive funds to
thrive compared to aggressive ones? And second, why do less aggressive funds allow
for better financial stability?
Consider this model with a single fund manager. Suppose she is currently oper-
ating in the unregulated environment with λmax = 20 and she hears that Basel will
soon be implemented. This can only lower her leverage limit. We posit that even
without any strategic interactions with other funds, she will be inclined to lower her
aggression levels. A fund gets more fees by generating higher returns, and higher
returns are gotten by taking high leverage when there are large mispricing signals.
When leverage limits are high, an aggressive fund will just snap up all the mispriced
assets and profit off of all of them. But when leverage limits become more stringent
under Basel, too much aggression will quickly lead to paralysis due to hitting the
leverage limit. In contrast, less aggression will preserve some investment capacity for
the truly large mispricing signals, generating a better return.
Now consider two funds who each know that Basel is coming. If they both decide
to be aggressive, they can mitigate more price movements, reduce price volatility, and
operate as if Basel was never implemented. However, if fund A decides to shirk its
price enforcing duties by being less aggressive, Basel will restrict maximum leverage
since price volatility will rise. This doesn’t affect fund A much since it doesn’t take
much leverage anyway. In fact, in all of our simulations, the funds playing strategy
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βh ∈ {5, 10} never defaulted a single time. But the leverage limit does affect the
more aggressive fund B, and will cause it to default eventually. When this happens,
A will have the entire market to itself. When this strategic advantage is coupled with
the fact that less aggressive funds stand to make more profit regardless of what other
funds do, it is easy to see why Basel induces funds to be less aggressive.
Now why does the shift to a less aggressive set of funds result in better default
rates, bank losses, and fees while not having any effect on price volatility? Note that
here we are only giving intuition for the effect of the shift in aggression distribution,
not the aggregate effect of Basel.
Less aggressive funds simply do not take much leverage before the mispricing
signal disappears randomly. Thus, they never get to the point where a price shock
can cause them to lose all their wealth. Again we quote the result that not a single
low-aggression fund defaulted in our experiments. Thus, default rates decrease when
funds are less aggressive.
Funds that are aggressive under equilibrium that default also cause less capital
loss to banks. Recall the feedback cycle that occurs with Basel. First, aggressive
firms accumulate all the wealth in good times since Basel hasn’t kicked in yet. Then,
a price shock happens that forces the aggressive funds to wind down their positions to
comply with collateral requirements. This procyclical unwinding deepens the initial
shock, increasing volatility and forcing Basel to make leverage limits more stringent.
When there are many less aggressive funds, none of this volatility can be absorbed
and the Basel requirements will get extremely stringent. Thus, the funds that end up
defaulting will have been trying to reach a lower leverage limit. This reduces their
size when they default.
Fees are slightly helped by less aggression for the same reason funds decided to
be less aggressive in the first place. And price volatility is definitely increased in
normal times by less aggressive funds, but the decrease in default rate reflects a lower
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incidence of financial crashes, which helps price volatility. It seems these two effects
cancel out.
2.4 Summary
When evaluating the effect of financial regulation on markets, we should always be
aware that agents in this arena are highly sophisticated and resourceful. It is a good
bet that any possible path to profit will eventually be explored. So when economic
models make fixed assumptions on behavior, we should always be on guard for the day
these assumptions start break down. To become more robust, models can endogenize
important behavioral assumptions so that agent response to the environment is as
realistic as possible.
In this chapter I argued for endogenizing the aggression level of funds in an agent
based leverage cycle model used to evaluate Basel regulations. I then proposed a
strategic analysis that endogenizes an important fixed assumption, the aggression
distribution. After making appropriate approximations to make finding equilibria
feasible, I performed a series of experiments to measure the aggregate effect of Basel
on financial stability under our new equilibrium concept. My findings suggest that
the pessimism surrounding Basel’s exacerbation of leverage cycles may be overstated.
I find that irrecoverable losses on the part of banks and defaulted funds are reduced
substantially under Basel. Although fund profits fall, my new equilibrium concept
lessens the fall compared to the one without endogenous aggression. Volatility remains
a problem, as funds still cannot prevent day to day fluctuations in price effectively.
There is still much work to be done, both in evaluating Basel and in building
richer economic models. For the former, the obvious question is how to improve on
Basel so that we get its benefits (less aggressive agents on average) without its costs
(agents constrained from taking volatility out of prices). There has been some work
on this, but not under endogenous aggression levels [3, 50, 51].
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There are also many other directions where computer science techniques can aid
in understanding Basel regulations. A notable fixed assumption in the leverage cycle
model is that funds may borrow at fixed terms from banks, and that funds have
no credit operations of their own. In reality, interest rates and leverage limits are
dynamically evolving according to the strategy employed by banks. In addition, the
separate roles of banks (who extend credit) and funds (who invest in assets) are
not so clear cut; major financial players tend to be active in both arenas. In fact,
this omission of credit policies by leverage cycle models causes several phenomenon
observed during the 2008 crisis to be ignored, including:
1. The seizing up of credit markets, causing liquidity shortages.
2. The widespread effects of isolated defaults, dubbed contagion.
3. The simultaneous downgrading of credit by ratings agencies and credit issuers.
The infrastructure for building a model incorporating these phenomena requires




Financial credit networks and strategic payments
In this chapter I detail a general framework for representing the state of a financial
system as a graph, called financial credit networks or FCNs [12]. This frame-
work can be used as a basis to construct agent-based models where strategic loan
decisions that are made locally can have global implications on financial stability,
as in Chapter IV. I use an abstract agent-based model in this chapter in order to
establish basic properties of the FCN framework, from which I can build economic
intuition in more realistic models. I will show that a strategic tension exists in how
agents choose to utilize the network to make payments, and use EGTA to establish
equilibrium behavior under different environmental conditions.
3.1 Introduction
The key functions of a financial system are to allocate funds to productive uses
and support transactions across a heterogeneous set of agents. These functions often
interact; for example banks provide payment services to consumers in order to attract
deposits, which they can then lend out. At the core of both these functions is the
management of financial obligations between parties. I therefore view expression of
such obligations as prerequisite to comprehensive financial modeling, and introduce
here the FCN framework based on these relations. My focus in this chapter is on
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payment operations, which serve as a foundation for general economic transactions
such as the purchase of routine products and services, lending and saving, and capital
investment.
I extend an existing abstract model of credit networks: weighted directed
graphs that represent the capacity of agents (each represented as a node in the graph)
to transact with each other. The credit network model was proposed independently
by several distinct groups of researchers who were motivated to capture distributed
trust in different contexts. Ghosh et al. [27] aimed to support distributed payment
and multi-user credit checking for multi-item auctions. Karlan et al. [36] wanted to
construct an economic model of informal borrowing networks. In both of these cases,
the concept of credit is financial in nature. In two other cases [20, 45], credit serves
as an accounting mechanism to limit computational actions. Moreno-Sanchez et al.
[46] demonstrated a privacy-preserving payment protocol for credit networks, and
also suggest that some real distributed payment systems like Ripple are based on the
credit network model.
The effectiveness of credit networks for distributed transactions was most pow-
erfully demonstrated by Dandekar et al. [17], who established several propositions
indicating that transaction failures are unlikely given sufficient network connectivity.
That is, credit networks provide a high degree of liquidity : the ability to transact at
any time at prevailing terms. In particular they showed for several classes of graphs,
the transaction failure probability goes to zero as either network size, link density, or
credit capacity increases, holding the other two parameters constant. Computational
experiments further demonstrate that even networks small in size or overall credit
capacity exhibit high transaction success rates if they are sufficiently well-connected.
A follow-up study addressed the question of whether self-interested agents would
issue sufficient credit to form such high-performing networks [18]. Issuing credit
entails a tradeoff between increasing the prospect of valuable transactions at the cost
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of exposure to risk of defaulting counterparties. The study found, across a range of
experimental environments, that if there is sufficient transaction profit to be earned,
a network will form to extract a sizable fraction of that surplus. However, the credit
networks formed in equilibrium are still suboptimal, as might be expected given the
positive externality in credit issuance. Namely, when an agent issues a credit line,
the entire network benefits from the liquidity it provides while only the issuer bears
the risk that the borrower may default.
To provide proper incentives to issue credit, a natural approach is to allow creditors
to charge interest on outstanding obligations. Pricing credit is of course standard in
actual financial systems, and so extending the credit network formalism to support
interest charges would also make them more suitable as a modeling substrate for this
domain. The extension to FCNs developed here is driven primarily by the requirement
for handling interest rates. I show how the representation of obligations must be
refined to accommodate interest on outstanding debt, and demonstrate how to realize
payment operations in the extended model.
In §3.2 I introduce the basic concepts of FCNs, through an extended example.
§3.3 presents the formal FCN model, and defines what constitutes a feasible solution
to the payment routing problem. Next (§3.4) I describe a polynomial algorithm that
solves for maximum flow on financial credit networks when interest rates are restricted
to the set of contract interest rates. I then show that this is equivalent to solving the
problem under unrestricted interest rates. This algorithm is due to my coauthor1, but
is included in this chapter for readability and completeness. In §3.5 I define several
payment mechanisms that select among multiple feasible routing solutions. In §3.6
I evaluate the liquidity of each mechanism experimentally and find that there is a
positive relationship between how much interest agents pay and how much liquidity is
available in the network. I find that several mechanisms exhibit liquidity performance
1Kareem Amin
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close to the no interest rate setting. The ability to pay interest rates above that offered
by lenders plays a large role in this good performance. Finally (§3.7), I consider
strategic choice by payers over routing mechanisms. I find that the socially optimum
payment mechanism is not strategically stable, but that agents are willing to pay a
limited amount in exchange for maintaining liquidity on a financial credit network.
3.2 Financial Credit Networks
A prerequisite for any payment is trust. Transactions between unknown parties
are often enabled by third parties (e.g., banks or credit card issuers) that assure suc-
cessful execution by mediating a transfer of obligations tantamount to a flow of funds.
In the early days of Internet commerce, platforms like eBay introduced reputation
mechanisms to facilitate the development of trust necessary to overcome lack of di-
rect experience with counterparties [54]. Others provided more direct mediation. For
example, Alibaba offered an escrow service whereby two parties that mutually trust
Alibaba can transact with each other, relying on Alibaba to make them whole if the
counterparty defaults [72].
In the basic credit network formalism, a’s trust of b is represented by a directed
weighted edge from a to b, where weight w denotes the capacity of credit a offers to
b. This credit is interpreted as an obligation for a to accept up to w units of IOUs
from b in exchange for commensurate service. These IOUs may be returned by a to
b at a later time, in exchange for service from b. The real power of credit networks,
though, comes from transactions along paths, achieving an effective transitivity of
trust. If a offers credit to b and b to c, then c can transact with a by routing its
payment through b: specifically, for a unit transaction c sends one of its IOUs to b,
and b sends one of its IOUs to a. The net result is a payment of one unit from a




Chains of payment are common occurrences in everyday commerce. Suppose Bob
wishes to buy a new car from his local dealership, AAWheels. He negotiates a deal
to purchase his favorite model for $25,000. Bob however does not carry that much
cash, and AAWheels does not trust him directly. Anticipating this issue, before car-
shopping Bob had applied for a credit line from MichiCarCash, a prominent consumer
lender, who after some research decided to issue a credit line of $25,000 at a healthy
interest rate (20%). MichiCarCash has a checking account with BigBank1, with a
current balance of $100,000. This deposit is essentially a loan to the bank (at a
relatively smaller interest rate, 2%), so we can think of MichCarCash as holding
100,000 BigBank1 IOUs. AAWheels maintains a no-interest checking account with
BigBank2, currently with zero balance, however it is willing to hold up to $400,000
there. This can be represented as a credit line from AAWheels to BigBank2.
The situation as described thus far comprises part of the FCN depicted in Fig-
ure 3.1a. BigBank1 and BigBank2 are connected through the interbank network,
which for present purposes I model as a complete subgraph of high-capacity credit
lines with nominal interest rates (1%). In the figure, credit edges are indicated with
solid arrows, and holdings of IOUs (i.e., actual loans) are indicated with dashed ar-
rows. Whereas in the original credit network formalism credit lines and IOU holdings
are treated uniformly, in FCNs we must distinguish them because IOUs accrue inter-
est payments and unused credit lines do not. The rates of interest associated with
credit and debt edges are annotated along with the capacities.
To purchase the car, Bob routes a payment of $25,000 to AAWheels. He can do so
by drawing on his credit line with MichiCarCash, who in turn returns a like number of
IOUs to BigBank1 (i.e., withdraws from its BigBank1 checking account), which then
sends its own IOUs through the interbank network2 to BigBank2, which credits the
2I do not model the actual network here, but capturing the structure of the broader financial
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(a) Initial credit network
(b) Credit network after 25K payment from Bob to AAWheels through
MichiCarCash
Figure 3.1: Financial credit networks before and after the transaction. Arrows indi-
cate obligations: solid for credit and dashed for IOUs. An arrow from x to y with
marking c | r denotes an obligation from x to y with capacity c at an interest rate r.
The direction of payment flow is against the arrows.
checking account of AAWheels (i.e., grants AAWheels 25,000 BigBank2 IOUs). As in
the basic credit network a → b → c example above, the source has decreased its net
capacity balance by the payment amount, and the destination accrues a corresponding
increase. The FCN after executing this payment is shown in Figure 3.1b.
3.2.2 Example continued: interest considerations
We can verify from the figure that intermediate nodes on the payment path ex-
perience no change in net capacity. For FCNs, however, I must also consider the
effect of interest rates. MichiCarCash receives new IOUs from Bob, in exchange for
returning BigBank1 IOUs. It is happy to do so though, because the Bob IOUs carry a
higher interest rate than the BigBank1 (interest checking) rate. Similarly, BigBank1
system is a long-term goal motivating this research. For instance, I could model cash as IOUs from
a central bank, which everyone trusts with high capacity at zero interest.
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accepts the payment routing because the rate on its checking IOUs exceeds the in-
terbank rate. Finally, BigBank2 effectively gets the interbank rate on the BigBank1
IOUs, and pays no interest on the checking account of AAWheels. The payment path
satisfies interest rate monotonicity, and so I deem it feasible; no agent routes this
payment at a loss.
I next consider other potential payment paths in this network. Bob has a friend
Joan, who also (coincidentally) trusts him for $25,000 and requires only 10% interest.
Joan, however, has no bank deposits, and her only way to route a payment through
the banking system is to use her BigBank1 credit card, which carries a 16% interest
rate and $25,000 credit limit. Routing a payment through Joan at the contract
rate (interest rates associated with issued credit lines) would violate monotonicity,
and is therefore infeasible. However, if Bob were to borrow from Joan at a higher
rate (say 16%), she would cover her credit card interest and still offer Bob a better
payment deal than he is getting from MichiCarCash. This keeps everyone satisfied,
so I consider paths that use credit lines above contract rates to be feasible as well.
Suppose instead of this credit line, Bob had been holding 25,000 IOUs from Joan
at a 10% interest rate. Joan cannot be expected to take these IOUs back to route
a payment that will cost her a higher rate. Moreover, unlike the situation with
credit lines, there is no obvious way to restore monotonicity by increasing a rate.
Bob has no means to compensate Joan other than by returning her IOUs (e.g., he
cannot route her a side payment), which merely saves her interest at the specified
rate. I therefore consider interest on IOUs to be fixed at the rate at which they were




Credit networks are formally specified by a capacitated graph G = (V,E) where
vertices represent agents, and edges represent credit relationships. A directed edge
e = (u, v) of capacity c(e) indicates that u is willing to lend up to c(e) units to v.
Dandekar et al. [17] observed that to determine whether agent s can pay agent t a
sum of X > 0 units, one needs only check whether there exists an s− t flow of value
X in the network derived by flipping the direction of edges in G.
To extend the basic framework with interest rates, we must first capture the
additional constraint that intermediary agents not incur a net interest cost. Second,
the introduction of interest requires that we distinguish capacity on outstanding credit
lines from capacity based on actually incurred debts (the IOU holdings).
3.3.1 Credit networks with interest rates
Formally, a financial credit network (FCN: credit network with interest rates)
is specified by a directed network G = (V,E). Each edge e ∈ E is associated with
three values. The first value is e’s obligation type, indicated by τ : E → {credit, iou}.
Second is the edge’s capacity, given by the function c : E → R+. As in the interest-
free setting, edge e’s capacity indicates the credit limit associated with that edge (if
τ(e) = credit), or the number of IOUs held, (if τ(e) = iou). Finally, a third value
r : E → R+ represents the edge’s contract interest rate . The values τ, c, r at an
edge e can be interpreted as follows. An edge e = (u, v) with τ(e) = credit, means
that u is willing to lend c(e) units to v at an interest rate of r(e). Edge e with
τ(e) = iou means that u owes c(e) units to v, on which v is charging an interest rate
of r(e).
One reason that credit edges must be distinguished from iou edges is to assess
periodic interest obligations. Another is that credit lines provide greater flexibility
on interest rates than do IOU holdings. For a credit line, willingness to lend at an
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interest rate r(e) implies willingness to lend at any interest rate r′ > r(e). In contrast,
the interest rate on debt represented by an IOU edge is fixed once the debt is incurred.
This flexibility turns out to be valuable for maximizing the liquidity of the network.
In particular, our model assumes that intermediaries along a payment path will not
route a payment at a loss. This amounts to requiring that payments be routed along
paths of monotonically nonincreasing interest rates. By paying a larger interest rate
on one of its immediate credit lines, an agent s may be able to route a payment to
another agent t that would otherwise be infeasible.
In describing our routing algorithm, it is convenient to refer to the reverse net-
work of G where edges point in the direction that payments occur, rather than the
direction of credit obligations. Define G† = (V,E†), the network identical to G but
with edges flipped. When applied to edges in E†, the functions τ , c, and r take the
same values as they would on the unflipped edges in E. We also define for each v ∈ V ,
In(v) = {(u, v) | (u, v) ∈ E†} and Out(v) = {(v, u) | (v, u) ∈ E†}. Note that G is
in fact a multigraph, as there may be many edges between two vertices, differing in
types or interest rates.3
3.3.2 Payment routing problem
Given a financial credit network N = {G, τ, c, r}, we now define what it means
for a payment of X > 0 units from agent s to t to be feasible . We call the problem
of determining whether a payment is feasible the payment routing problem .
As in an interest-free credit network, we demand that there exists an s − t flow
f : E† → R+ of value at least X in G†, where f respects the capacity constraints
denoted by c. In order for an FCN payment to be feasible, we also impose requirements
on the interest rates. Informally, we demand that payments between s and t flow along
3Thus, the use of the functions τ(e), r(e), c(e) is a slight abuse of notation. A single pair e = (u, v)
may, for example, be assigned multiple types. An edge in G is more accurately written as a 5-tuple
(u, v, c, r, τ). Nevertheless, for clarity, we write τ , r, and c unless this distinction is important.
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edges of non-increasing interest rate, which we call the monotonicity condition .
This condition is complicated by the fact that realized interest rates are not always
equal to contract rates. Whereas the contract interest rates on iou edges are fixed,
rates on credit edges can be increased to satisfy monotonicity. Payments that respect
this invariant are said to have valid realized interest rates.
Let a sequence of s− t paths P = (P (1), . . . , P (K)) and corresponding nonnegative
quantities F = (f (1), . . . , f (K)) be a consistent decomposition of a flow f if for
any edge e, f(e) =
∑K
k=1 1[e ∈ P (k)]f (k). In other words, f can be thought of as the
finite union of paths in G†, where each path P (k) is assigned flow value f (k).
For each such path P (k), which we take as a set of edges, we can define a function
r̂(k) : P (k) → R+ which assigns a realized interest rate to each edge along the
path. For example, if edge (u, v) belongs to path P (k), r̂(k)((u, v)) corresponds to
the interest rate charged to u by v on the f (k) units of payment routed along edge
e in path P (k). Consistent decompositions can be used to state the aforementioned
monotonicity and validity conditions more formally.
Definition III.1 (Validity). Given a consistent decomposition P, F , for some flow
f , and realized interest rate s {r̂(k)}, we say that the realized interest rates are valid
if, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and e ∈ P (k), r̂(k)(e) = r(e) if τ(e) = iou and r̂(k)(e) ≥ r(e) if
τ(e) = credit.
Definition III.2 (Monotonicity). Given a consistent decomposition P, F , for some
flow f , and realized interest rates {r̂(k)}, we say that the realized interest rates are
monotonic if, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} with P (k) = (e(k)1 , e
(k)
1 , . . . , e
(k)
nk ), and i ∈ {0, . . . , nk−1},
r̂(k)(ei) ≥ r̂(k)(ei+1).
Suppose there exists an s− t flow f of value X that admits a decomposition P, F
with valid and monotonic realized interest rates {r̂(k)}. A payment of X units can
be executed by routing, for each k, f (k) units along the s − t path P (k). Assigning
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each edge e on that path an interest rate of r̂(k)(e) ensures that no agent along the
path P (k) is routing this payment at a loss, as a consequence of monotonicity. Finally,
the validity of r̂(k) ensures that the realized interest rates are consistent with existing
rates on IOUs, and no smaller than the contract rate on credit lines employed.
Definition 1 (Feasible Payment). For FCN N with s, t ∈ V , we say that a payment
of amount X > 0 from source s to destination t is feasible if there exist (1) an s− t
flow f : E† → R+ of at least X, in the standard flow network defined by G† and
c, and (2) a consistent decomposition P, F of f , and corresponding realized interest
rates {r̂(k)} that are valid and monotonic.
3.4 Payment routing algorithm
Given an instance of the payment routing problem (N, s, t,X), our goal is to find
a flow f of value at least X in G†, and corresponding realized interest rates that
are valid and monotonic, or output that no such flow exists. In general, realized
interest rates may be any nonnegative real number. We start by restricting the rates
to come from some finite set I = {I1, . . . , Il} ⊂ R+. We show that this I-restricted
payment routing problem can be solved via linear programming. We then observe
that taking I to be the set of contract interest rates I = {r(e) | e ∈ E} suffices to
solve the unrestricted payment routing problem. In other words, payment (N, s, t,X)
is feasible if and only if it is feasible with realized interest rates restricted to the set
of initial contract rates.
3.4.1 I-restricted payment routing: monotonicity
The key construct for solving the I-restricted routing problem is a function f ′ :
E† × I → R+, which we call an interest-flow . We can think of f ′ as indicating
for each edge e ∈ E† and interest rate level I ∈ I the amount of payment along
edge e routed at a realized interest rate level I. Cast in this way, the problem is
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reminiscent of a multicommodity flow [22], where payment routed at an interest rate
I corresponds to a distinct commodity. Such problems are known to be NP-hard. In
our problem, however, a unit of flow entering a vertex v at interest rate I can exit as
a unit of flow at any interest rate I ′ ≤ I (i.e., monotonicity). This relaxation proves
crucial for developing a polynomial-time algorithm.
We say an interest flow is valid in the analogous way to realized interest rates.
Namely f ′ is valid if for any e, I, f ′(e, I) ≥ 0 only if τ(e) = iou and I = r(e)
or τ(e) = credit and I ≥ r(e). The main result of this section establishes that the
monotonicity of the realized interest rates can be compactly represented as a collection
of local inequalities on the interest-flow. We see that monotonicity is equivalent to
the requirement that for every interest rate level I, and vertex v, the flow into v at
interest rates I ′ ≤ I is no more than the flow out of v at interest rates I ′ ≤ I.
Lemma 1. Let f : E† → R+ be an arbitrary s − t flow. f admits a consistent
decomposition, along with a set of I-restricted, valid, monotonic realized interest
rates if and only if there exists a valid interest-flow satisfying the following conditions.
For every e ∈ E†:
∑
I∈I
f ′(e, I) = f(e), and (3.1)










f ′(e, I ′). (3.2)
Proof. In the first direction, we suppose that f admits a consistent decomposition
with valid, monotonic interest rates, then show that there exists a valid interest-
flow satisfying the conditions (3.1) and (3.2). Fix an s − t flow f , a consistent
decomposition F, P , and realized interest rates {r̂(k)}. Define f ′(e, I) ≡
∑K
k=1 1[e ∈
P (k)]1[r̂(k)(e) = I]f (k). That is, f ′(e, I) simply aggregates the flow values along edges
e that were assigned interest rate I. We now check condition (3.2). Fixing a vertex
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1[e ∈ P (k)]1[r̂(k)(e) = I ′]f (k). (3.3)
If there exists some path P (k) containing an edge (u, v) with r̂(k)((u, v)) = I ′, then
the very next edge (v, w) in P (k) must satisfy r(k)((v, w)) ≤ I ′, by monotonicity. Thus,




















condition (3.2) is satisfied.
From the definition of consistent decomposition, we know that f(e) =
∑K
k=1 1[e ∈








by how we have defined f ′, and so (3.1) is satisfied as well. Finally, the validity of f ′
follows immediately from the validity of the realized interest rates.
In the other direction, fix f , and let f ′ be a valid interest-flow satisfying conditions
(3.1) and (3.2). We use f ′ to reconstruct a consistent decomposition P, F of f with
valid and consistent interest rates. Consider a vertex v ∈ V . We assign interest rates
to the flow entering and exiting v according to f ′. That is, for each edge e containing
v, with flow value f(e), we take f ′(e, I) units of that flow and assign it a realized
interest rate of I.
If interest rates are assigned in this manner, all flow entering v can be routed out of







′(e, I1) which in turn implies that all
incoming flow at interest rate I1 can be routed out of some edge at rate I1. Now
fix some Ik−1 and suppose for induction that there is a way to route all incoming
flow at I ′ ≤ Ik−1 out of v while respecting monotonicity. To route all incoming
flow at level I ′ ≤ Ik, we first assign all flow entering v at level I ′ ≤ Ik−1 to outgoing
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′(e, Ik) units of flow entering at exactly level Ik there needs to be
enough remaining capacity on the outgoing edges at interest rate I ′ ≤ Ik. In other






















f ′(e, I ′)
which is implied by (3.2).
Thus, f can be decomposed into P, F , where the interest rates {r(k)} assigned
along the paths are derived from the above procedure. By (3.1) all flow is accounted
for, and since f ′ is valid, {r(k)} is also valid.
3.4.2 A linear program for I-restricted payment routing
With Lemma 1 in hand, we can derive a linear program for solving the I-restricted
payment routing problem (Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP). The first four condi-
tions of the LP make it so that the ordinary flow f derived from the interest-flow f ′
(via (3.1)) is both a valid flow and routes X units of payment from s to t. The re-
maining conditions specify that f ′ also induces valid, monotonic, interest rates, which
is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Theorem III.3. Given an instance (N, s, t,X) of the I-restricted routing problem,
the payment is feasible if and only if the LP solved by Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP
has a solution of value at least X. Furthermore, the LP has a total of O(|I||E|)
variables and O(|I|(|V |+ |E|)) constraints.
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3.4.3 A solution to the unrestricted problem
We now prove that the payment (N, s, t,X) is feasible with unrestricted interest
rates if and only if there is a feasible payment for the I-restricted routing problem,
when taking I = {r(e) | e ∈ E}, the set of initial contract interest rates. As a con-









































∀e ∈ E†, τ(e) = credit,∀I < r(e) : fe,I = 0
∀e ∈ E†, τ(e) = iou,∀I 6= r(e) : fe,I = 0 (Valid Interest Rates)
∀e ∈ Ef, I : 0 ≤ fe,I ,∀e : 0 ≤ fe ≤ c(e) (Capacity)
First note that if there is no solution to the general (non-restricted) payment
routing problem, then clearly there cannot be a solution to the I-restricted payment
routing problem (for any I). The following lemma states that the other direction
holds as well, when taking I to be the original set of contract interest rates.
Lemma 2. Given an instance of the payment routing problem, let I = {r(e) | e ∈ E}.
There exists a feasible payment for the payment routing problem if and only if there
exists a feasible payment for the I-restricted payment routing problem.
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Proof. As described above, one direction is immediate, and so we prove that the exis-
tence of a solution to the non-restricted payment routing problem implies a solution
to the I-restricted payment routing problem.
Let f be the flow solution to the non-restricted problem, with consistent decom-
position P, F , and valid, monotonic realized interest rates {r̂(k)}. We define a new
set of realized interest rates {r̂(k)I } which take values only in I, but are still valid
and monotonic. f is still a flow for the restricted problem, and F, P a consistent
decomposition, so this is sufficient to prove the lemma.
To define {r̂(k)I }, fix a k, and consider the path P (k) = (e
(k)
1 , . . . , e
(k)
nk ). For any
edge ei such that τ(ei) = iou, we leave the interest rate unchanged. That is, we set
r̂
(k)
I (ei) = r̂
(k)(ei) which is also equal to r(ei) since {r̂(k)} are valid.
Next consider edges ei such that τ(ei) = credit. At a high level, we define r̂
(k)
I (ei)
by taking r(k)(ei) and increasing it to the contract rate of the preceding iou edge
along the path. In detail, if ei and ej, for i < j, are consecutive iou edges in P
(k),
then for all ei′ , i < i
′ < j we define r̂
(k)
I (ei′) by letting r̂
(k)
I (ei′) = r(ei). The validity
and monotonicity of r̂(k) tells us that r(ei) = r̂
(k)(ei) ≥ r̂(k)(ei+1) ≥ · · · ≥ r̂(k)(ej) =
r(k)(ej). And therefore r(ei) = r̂
(k)
I (ei) = r̂
(k)
I (ei+1) = · · · = r̂
(k)
I (ej−1) ≥ r̂
(k)
I (ej) =
r(ej). Similarly, if ei is the last iou edge, we set r̂
(k)
I (ei′) = r(ei) for i < i
′ ≤ nk.
Finally, if ej is the first iou edge, we set r̂
(k)
I (ei′) = max{r(e1), r(e2), . . . , r(ej)}, and
therefore r̂
(k)
I (e1) = · · · = r̂
(k)
I (ej−1) ≥ r̂
(k)
I (ej) = r(ej). In each of these cases r̂
(k)
I (·)
is monotonically nonincreasing over the subsequence in question, and is therefore
nonincreasing along the entire path.
The {r̂(k)I } are also valid since the realized interest rate for iou edges are unchanged
(compared to r̂(k)), and the realized interest rate for credit edges only increase, so
the validity of {r̂(k)} also ensures that r̂(k)I (ei) ≥ r̂(k)(ei) ≥ r(ei) for any edge ei.
Observing that the construction ensures the each r̂
(k)
I takes values in I concludes the
proof.
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Lemma 2 tells us that the I-restricted problem is equivalent to the non-restricted
problem when I = {r(e) ∈ E}. Thus, we can state our main algorithmic result as a
corollary of this lemma and Theorem III.3.
Corollary 1. Let I = {r(e) | e ∈ I} be the set of contract interest rates. Given an
instance (N, s, t,X) of the payment routing problem, the payment is feasible if and
only if the the LP solved by Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP finds a solution of value
at least X for the I-restricted routing problem.
3.4.4 Routing multiple payments
The preceding demonstrates how to efficiently compute whether a payment is
feasible for some static instance (N, s, t,X) of the payment routing problem in an
FCN. To route multiple payments in sequence, we update the FCN N after each to
reflect the state of obligations between agents. An illustration of such an update is
provided in Figure 3.1a. Here we describe this update formally. In order to do so,
we must be explicit about the fact that G contains multi-edges described by 5-tuples
(u, v, τ, c, r).
A feasible payment is given by a flow f in G†, a consistent decomposition F =
{f (1), . . . , f (K)}, P = {P (1), . . . , P (K)}, and realized interest rates {r̂(1), . . . , r̂(1)}.
Given such a payment N = (G, τ, c, r) is updated as follows. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
consider each edge e = (u, v) ∈ P (k).
If τ(e) = iou, the payment was routed through edge e by having v relinquish
f (k) IOUs back to u. Thus, there exists some edge (v, u, iou, c, r) in G, for some c
and r. We update this edge to (v, u, iou, c − f (k), r). At the same time, if there
exists a credit line from u to v represented by (u, v, credit, c′, r′), we update this edge
to (u, v, credit, c′ + f (k), r′), (allowing c′ = 0 if the credit line between u and v is
saturated).
If τ(e) = credit, the payment was routed through edge e by drawing upon a line
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of credit that v extends to u. Thus, there exists some edge (v, u, credit, c, r) in G, for
some values of c and r. We update this edge to (v, u, credit, c−f (k), r). Drawing upon
this credit creates a debt that u owes v at realized interest rate r(k)(e). Thus, if there
exists an edge (u, v, iou, c′, r(k)(e)), we update this edge to (u, v, iou, c′+ f (k), r(k)(e)),
otherwise we create a new iou edge given by (u, v, f (k), r(k)(e)). Note that in both
these cases, the newly created IOU is given the realized interest rate for the credit
line.
3.5 Payment mechanisms
In general, there may be several feasible ways to route a payment between two
agents. In this section, I discuss payment mechanisms : rules for choosing flows
to achieve a designated payment.
3.5.1 Choice of payment paths
In basic credit networks, the selection of payment paths has no bearing on long-
term liquidity. Dandekar et al. [17] showed that if a sequence of unit flows defined by
source/sink pairs {s1, t1}, . . . , {sk, tk} is feasible using corresponding payment paths
{P1, . . . , Pk} on a network with unit capacities, they remain feasible if Pi, for any i,
is changed to an arbitrary feasible payment path P ′i . Given this invariance, and the
lack of any differential costs, selecting among feasible payment paths has not been a





1|0.2, # 2 1|0.2, # 4
Figure 3.2: Dotted arrows represent IOUs, and edges are identified by #num labels.
The max flow from s to t is two, but a unit payment on the (red) path (#1,#4)
blocks any subsequent flow.
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In FCNs, however, interest rates do pose differential costs, and moreover the liq-
uidity invariance property does not hold. Consider the simple example of Figure 3.2.
The max flow between s and t is 2, but if a payment of one unit is first routed along
the red path, no further flow is achievable. Payment on the path comprising edges
#2 and #3 in the residual FCN would be infeasible due to the interest monotonicity
constraint. So in general the success of a sequence of transactions may depend on
which feasible payment paths are chosen. As I show below, alternative path selection
mechanisms exhibit systematically different long-term liquidity properties.
3.5.2 Mechanism definitions
One way to define alternative payment mechanisms is by refining the objective
function of MaxInterestFlowLP. Instead of maximizing flow, I specify the requested
flow as a constraint and insert criteria for choosing among feasible flows in the objec-
tive. For example, I could choose based on length of paths, or some function of the
interest rates on the included paths.
The monotonicity constraint ensures that intermediate nodes accrue nonnegative
net interest, but alternative paths may differ on the amount of positive net interest.
The payment source generally pays positive interest. I term the interest associated
with the first edge on a payment path the originating rate . To the extent the
transaction initiator has influence over paths chosen, it may be particularly concerned
with minimizing this rate.
For mechanisms below, fix I to be the set of initial contract interest rates, and
let I+ , max(I) be the maximum possible interest rate in the network. Let s be
the source, and Out(s) the outgoing edges from s in the reverse network G†, as
defined in §3.3.1. The mechanisms are defined by replacing the objective function of
MaxInterestFlowLP with those exhibited, fixing the flow to the requested amount,
and in one instance adding additional constraints. The optimization variables and
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fe,I × I Minimize source cost (MinSrc)
The MinSrc mechanism minimizes the originating rate. I place a cost equal to the




fe,I × (I + (I+ + 1)× 1{τ(e) = credit})
Minimize credit usage (MinCred)
The MinCred mechanism prioritizes use of IOUs relative to credit lines. The idea
is that since credit edges have flexible realized interest rates, their capacity should be
preserved for future situations. The originating rate is minimized secondarily. The
flexibility provided by a credit line could enable additional payment paths by raising
the originating interest rate when necessary. The I+ + 1 term is simply a way to




fe,I × I Restrict to contract rates (NoMarkup)
∀e, I > r(e) : fe,I = 0
For flow fe,I on a credit line, I refer to the difference I − r(e) as the interest
markup. The markup is additional interest above the contract rate assessed on
credit edges in order to make a payment path monotone. The NoMarkup mechanism
minimizes originating rate, subject to constraints disallowing any agent from drawing
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on credit lines at anything other than their contract rates. NoMarkup is unique
among the mechanisms I consider in that it imposes additional constraints beyond
flow feasibility. This allows us to evaluate the effect of flexible markup policies (which




fe,I × 1{I = I+} Maximize total interest paid (MaxIR)
Given an FCN initially consisting of credit edges, liquidity is maximized by always
assessing the highest interest rate possible. In fact, this MaxIR mechanism provides
liquidity equivalent to that of basic credit networks (Theorem III.5). Note that MaxIR
is sensitive to the maximum interest rate I+, and thus is not very robust. I can peg
the interest paid to an arbitrarily high rate r∗ by introducing a single credit edge e′
with r(e′) = r∗, regardless of how much credit exists at reasonable rates. I include
MaxIR to provide an upper bound on liquidity and demonstrate the tradeoff between
liquidity and interest rates.
3.6 Steady-state liquidity analysis
With respect to a given transaction, any payment mechanism that does not re-
strict feasible payments (i.e., all those listed above except NoMarkup) offers the same
prospects for success. As illustrated in §3.5.1, however, how a payment is routed
can affect the network’s configuration, which changes the prospects for subsequent
transactions. Alternative payment mechanisms may affect network configurations sys-
tematically, and thus have a qualitative impact on liquidity. I measure liquidity by
the long-term failure rate of transactions once the network has reached a steady-state
distribution over network configurations. I call this the steady-state transaction




Our experimental setup is designed as an extension of the no-interest liquidity
analysis of Dandekar et al. [17]. I initialize an Erdos-Renyi graph [21] with a chosen
average degree between 5 and 35, and size of 200 nodes. Each directed edge represents
a credit line with initial capacity 10. Edge orientation is a fair coin toss and interest
rates are generated uniformly from a specified set I. Namely, if I choose to have
four interest rates, each edge is assigned contract rates of 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, or 0.04
uniformly, and so on for different |I|. I generate transactions by selecting source
and destination nodes uniformly at random and attempting to route 10 units of flow
between them.
For each mechanism, I attempt to route transactions sequentially while recording
any failures. Following a failure, I do nothing to the graph. After 9000 transaction
attempts, I check the failure rate among the first 4500 against the second 4500 trans-
actions. If the two failure rates are within 0.002 of each other, I stop and record the
failure rate of the entire history as the steady-state failure rate. Otherwise, I gener-
ate another transaction and move our observation window forward by one, that is, I
compare observations 2 through 4501 with 4502 through 9001. This continues until
I satisfy our steady-state criterion. I perform the whole process ten times, averaging
the results.
Note that for purposes of this liquidity analysis, I do not consider actual interest
payments. Interest plays a role here only for transaction feasibility and selection of
flows by payment mechanisms.
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3.6.2 Steady-state liquidity of FCNs
A network configuration, or state , is a single specification of the tuple {G, τ, c, r}.
In our simulations, the initial state is set at τ(e) = credit, c maps to a constant integer,
r maps to an element of a set of constant size, and G is an Erdos-Renyi graph, for all
e ∈ E. The number of reachable states is in general unbounded, since a flow on an
edge may take on any value between 0 and c(e), leaving any real value as a possible
residual capacity. However, if |I| is finite, payment amounts are integers, and all flows
are restricted to be integral, then the number of states is finite. In all the simulations
reported here, I route constant integer payment amounts under bounded |I|. As the
linear program solver software I used (CPLEX) maintains integer solutions, the set
of states is finite and discrete [32].
The generation of random transactions induces a transition probability matrix
between states. The resulting stochastic process is an ergodic Markov chain and
therefore has a steady-state distribution.
Theorem III.4. Let h, h′ ∈ T where T is the finite state space over states of the
FCN, when routing integer valued flows of amount X. Let P (h, h′) be the probability
of moving from state h to state h′. These probabilities are induced by the transaction
probability matrix Λ which picks any source and sink node pair (s, t) with positive
probability, between which a payment of amount X is attempted. This stochastic
process χ is an ergodic Markov chain.
Proof. First note that χ satisfies the Markov property. Given I are in state h, P (h, h′)
is independent of any other future or historical state for any state h′. To calculate
this probability, I can just sum the probabilities of every transaction that will get us
from h to h′.
To show that χ is ergodic, first I need that h is reachable from h′ with nonzero
probability (irreducibility), for any h, h′ ∈ T . I use the fact that any pair of nodes
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can be selected for a transaction with nonzero probability, since I choose the source
and sink uniformly at random. So any series of pairwise transactions also has nonzero
probability. In particular, neighbors in the graph can be selected with positive prob-
ability. Given h, I can always find a series of pairwise transactions between neighbors
to reach h′. The reason for this is that any one-hop path can be routed ignoring
the monotonicity constraint, since the source is willing to pay any originating rate.
So first I can route flows on a sequence of one-hop paths that cancels all existing
IOUs and returns to G to the all-credit edge graph. I can then route a sequence of
transactions that result in the exact configuration of h′. So χ is irreducible.
A version of the ergodicity theorem says that for a finite-state irreducible Markov
chain, I need only one state to be aperiodic in order for all states to be aperiodic [60].
Consider a state h, with two agents s and t such that a payment between s and t
is not feasible. Since there is a non-zero probability of picking s and t for the next
transaction, there is a non-zero probability that h transitions to itself. Therefore, the
state h is aperiodic, which implies that the Markov chain is aperiodic. Such a state
is always reachable by considering a sequence of states that fill all feasible payment
paths from s to t to capacity.
This means that after routing enough transactions, the overall probability of being
in a particular state is invariant. Since failure probability is a function of network
state, this probability is also invariant. Following Dandekar et al. [17], I use this
steady-state failure probability as our measure of liquidity. I expect the procedure
of §3.6.1 to yield the correct liquidity if our error tolerance is appropriately chosen.
Thus, I can evaluate the liquidity when using each of our payment mechanisms.
Notably, the MaxIR mechanism maximizes liquidity.
Theorem III.5. Initialize an FCN G = (V,E) such that ∀e ∈ E, τ(e) = credit.
If mechanism MaxIR is used for every payment in G with contract rates I, each
transaction is infeasible iff it is infeasible under a basic (interest-free) credit network
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with the same graph structure.
Proof. If a transaction is infeasible in the interest-free network, then adding additional
constraints by including interest rates will not cause it to succeed. In the other
direction, no matter how many transactions are routed on G under I, there will never
exist an interest rate on an IOU that is not I+. That is, ∀e ∈ E.τ(e) = IOU =⇒
r(e) = I+, by definition of the mechanism. Furthermore, the mechanism always opts
for the maximum markup on every credit edge. Thus, realized interest rates are
constant, at the value I+, and monotonicity is trivially satisfied. If a payment of
amount X is not feasible it must be because there was no s − t flow of amount X,
which implies that the payment is not feasible in the interest-free network.
3.6.3 Markup flexibility on credit lines
Figure 3.3 indicates that steady-state failure rate converges and becomes small at
around degree 25 regardless of how many interest rates are available and regardless
of which payment mechanism I use. The number of available interest rates is much
more influential when the NoMarkup mechanism is used. Especially striking is how
much allowing markups increased liquidity at lower degrees. The liquidity of MinSrc
is almost as good as the basic credit network case (i.e., one interest rate) at degrees
as low as 10. |I| has minimal effect on liquidity. For comparison, NoMarkup has
almost three times the failure rate of the basic credit network at degree 10. This
suggests that accounting for interest has modest effect on liquidity as long as agents
are allowed to increase rates on credit lines.
3.6.4 Tradeoff between high markups and better liquidity
I already know that FCN liquidity is maximized by forcing every agent to pay
the maximum possible interest rate on every edge. The relationship between higher
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Figure 3.3: Steady-state failure probabilities for NoMarkup and MinSrc mechanisms
at degrees 5 to 25, Erdos-Renyi graphs with 200 nodes. “xIR” means |I| = x.
see that compared to MinSrc, the MinCred mechanism yields a slightly higher average
interest rate on IOUs. Correspondingly, it has a slightly lower steady-state failure rate
(Figure 3.4a). Many other heuristic mechanisms were tested and the relation between
interest and failure rates held true. For brevity, I omit detailed descriptions, and show
only average interest and failure rates (Figure 3.5). Conditional on average degree of
the graph, almost all variation in liquidity among mechanisms can be explained by the
average interest rate paid by agents when the mechanism is employed. The tradeoff
is clear: better liquidity comes with higher interest rates. This tradeoff diminishes











































(b) Interest rate level
Figure 3.4: Failure rate and average interest rate level over all IOUs in the final graph,
obtained after reaching steady state. Starting from degree 7, difference in failure rate
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Figure 3.5: Each point represents a heuristic payment mechanism’s steady state fail-
ure rate at a certain average interest rate level on Erdos-Renyi graphs of fixed average
degree. Each dotted line represents a collection of mechanisms whose liquidity was
tested at a fixed average degree.
The explanation for this is straightforward. Given the monotonicity constraint,
an IOU at low interest restricts the completing paths. Thus, higher interest on IOUs
promotes greater transaction capacity for the network.
3.7 Strategic routing game
The relationship between interest rates and liquidity presents a strategic dilemma
for choice among mechanisms. A low originating interest rate minimizes costs for the
payer, but imposes an externality on the rest of the network in the form of reduced
liquidity. I explore the conflict between individual incentives and global effectiveness
in FCNs by defining a game, where the source of each transaction chooses a payment
mechanism. I evaluate the game by simulation, over a range of network settings and
payment mechanisms similar to those explored in the liquidity study above.
Our scenario employs 100 agents initialized to a random-graph FCN, who attempt
to execute a randomly generated sequence of transactions. Specifically, the steps of
each simulation run are: (1) Assign strategies to agents according to a specified
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strategy profile. Strategies in this context are simply payment mechanisms as defined
in §3.5.2. (2) Generate a directed Erdos-Renyi graph with 100 nodes and a specified
average degree. Assign agents to these nodes. Set the capacity on each edge to 100,
and the contract interest uniformly at random from the set {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04}.
Initialize the payoff for each agent to zero. (3) Choose a source and sink uniformly at
random. (4) Attempt to route 100 units from source to sink using the source’s fixed
strategy. If successful, update the FCN based on the chosen flows, and increment
the source’s payoff by the amount xVal . (5) Repeat steps (3) and (4) 2000 times.
(6) Calculate net interest income for each node, and add this to the corresponding
payoff.
The interest income is defined under the assumption that IOUs resulting from
the transaction sequence remain outstanding for one period. Let INx = {euv ∈
E : v = x, τ(euv) = iou} denote the set of incoming IOUs of node x, and similarly
OUTx = {euv ∈ E : u = x, τ(euv) = iou} the outgoing IOUs of x. Node x’s net




e∈OUTs c(e)× r(e). An agent’s overall
payoff is the cumulative value from successful transactions plus net interest income.
In our analysis the only scenario parameter I vary is the average degree of the
initial random graph.4 I explored three settings: 8, 15, and 22.
Since promoting liquidity comes with positive externalities, I would not expect to
see social welfare maximized in equilibrium. Our hypothesis was that agents would
choose to pay a lower originating rate than is socially optimal. To evaluate this hy-
pothesis, I performed simulations over strategy profiles combining three mechanisms:
MinSrc, MinCred, and MaxIR. These represent three points on the spectrum between
minimizing interest cost (MinSrc) and maximizing liquidity (MaxIR).
To evaluate a profile, I average over at least 1500 simulation runs, to produce
accurate payoff estimates. This takes 50-100 core-hours, depending on average node
4I explored two xVal settings, but observed no interesting differences, so report results only for
xVal = 10.
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Pure Strategy Profile Payoffs
Average 
Degree
MaxIR MinCred MinSrc PSNE
Dominated 
Strategies
8 145 139 132 MinSrc, MinCred MaxIR
15 180 178 177 MinCred MaxIR
22 193 192 192 MinCred MaxIR, MinSrc
Figure 3.6: Payoff and symmetric equilibria information for varying average degree.
degree. Even with only three strategies, exhaustive simulation of profiles for 100
players is not feasible. Exploiting symmetry, there are 5151 profiles in the full game,
which would take too long to cover with available resources. I therefore employed
deviation preserving reduction [71] to approximate the 100-player game with a reduced
4-player version. This required simulation of only 30 full-game (100-agent) profiles to
estimate each game model.
Among the symmetric pure-strategy profiles (i.e., where all players choose the
same strategy) shown in Figure 3.6, the profile with the highest social welfare (i.e.,
sum of all payoffs) in every setting is that where all players play MaxIR. The MinCred
profile had lower social welfare, followed by MinSrc. MaxIR was dominated at all
settings. I searched for symmetric Nash equilibria using replicator dynamics [59].
I found only pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in our experiments, reflecting a
coordination benefit for adopting a uniform mechanism.
MinSrc and MinCred exhibited similar payoffs in most profiles containing both
strategies. At low average degree (8), I found PSNE consisting of both strategies,
but at high average degree (15, 22) only MinCred is an equilibrium. At average
degree 22, the Mincred PSNE was confirmed statistically using the bootstrapped
regret methodology outlined by Wiedenbeck et al. [69]. No other games exhibited
solutions with zero regret at the 95th percentile.
Though the socially optimal outcome (i.e., all agents playing MaxIR) is strate-
gically unstable, the fact that MinCred is competitive with MinSrc is encouraging.
From Figure 3.4 I know that MinCred trades off higher interest rate for better liquidity
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compared to MinSrc. This suggests that agents have some willingness to pay higher
interest, in conjunction with the coordination benefit, to achieve higher liquidity.
3.8 Summary
I have extended the credit-network model of distributed trust with interest rates
and a distinction between credit lines and debt. FCNs provide a standard means to
represent incentives for extending credit, and thereby also support direct modeling
of real-world financial relationships. The extension to support interest rates raises
new issues in routing payments over the network, in the form of constraints to assure
the willingness of intermediaries to participate. These are further complicated by a
distinction between credit lines and debt, namely that the former may admit flexibility
in rates whereas the latter are more rigid. I formalize these constraints, and develop
an efficient algorithm for determining a feasible payment flow, as well as a range of
mechanisms for choosing among feasible flows.
Given the plethora of routing policies and options, I perform computational studies
to explore the implications of alternative mechanisms on network liquidity. I find that
performance can vary greatly across mechanisms, and moreover that there may be
a strategic tension between preferences of the transaction source and global network
effectiveness. I explore this issue through empirical game-theoretic analysis, and
find that while this tension does exist, there is evidence that agents will not simply
maximize myopic gain and instead consider overall network liquidity in equilibrium.
3.9 Economic modeling using FCNs
In this chapter I have focused on outlining how the ability to make payments is
affected by network structure and choice of payment mechanism. I showed through
experiments that the failure rate of transactions is drastically reduced by the use
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of interest rate markups, but equally important to constructing economic models is
the amount of the markup. Given an FCN, a payment mechanism, and a payment,
the amount of markup given by Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP reflects in some sense
the cost of providing liquidity (remember that liquidity is defined as the likelihood
of a successful transaction). A real-world analog of this cost is the liquidity haircut
that firms typically take in order to sell illiquid assets (such as long term debt or
mortgages). This is the liquidity cost of making the payment. The experiments
done in this chapter show that liquidity costs in an FCN consist of:
1. Remoteness of the payment destination (i.e., how many types of IOUs the des-
tination will accept as payment)
2. Liquidity of the payment source’s assets
3. Average degree in the FCN
4. Choice of payment mechanism
All of 1-3 reflect determinants of liquidity cost in real debt markets. An example
of 1) is a vendor not accepting personal checks as payment, or requiring a fee. 2) can,
for example, reflect how much cash the payment source decides to carry; cash will
never incur a liquidity cost because it can be used to make any payment. 3) is more of
a macroeconomic condition reflecting overall competition for servicing the payment.
High degree implies more possible payment paths, out of which a low markup one
can be chosen by the source. 4) does not correspond to real debt markets directly, so
I will simply assume all payment source agents are choosing the markup-minimizing
mechanism going forward.
In order to establish the basic payments properties of FCNs, two economic activ-
ities have been abstracted away in this chapter. First is the motivation for making
payments. What good or service is being paid for, and what is the decision process
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behind making these payments? Second is the origin of the underlying trust modeled
by the FCN. Why should there be trust, and how does it form? These questions rep-
resent the opportunity to build an agent-based model of the financial system using
FCNs, which I proceed to do in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
An agent-based model of the credit cycle
In Chapter IV we evaluated Basel-style leverage regulations using a dynamic model
of the asset market. In this chapter, I introduce a new agent-based model that en-
ables further evaluation of such regulation, considering evolving debt relations among
banks. Debt as an investment is qualitatively different from investing in single-asset
markets since each debt contract entitles the holder to payments from a specific bor-
rower. Thus, in a system with n banks, there are n − 1 different types of debt for
each creditor to invest in (lenders cannot borrow from themselves). To accommodate
this heterogeneity, creditors offer highly variable terms based on the perceived risk-
iness of borrowers. A model of debt dynamics must be able to express these terms.
The original FCNs allow creditors to specify a single term feature on debt contracts:
the interest rate. I introduce extended FCNs (or EFCNs) in order to model debt
contracts that also specify a collateral rate . This allows creditors to specify how
much of their debt they will automatically recoup if a borrower defaults. Setting this
rate is an important tactic for lenders to control risk, and allows for two broad types
of debt to be issued: secured debt , which has a high collateral rate, and unsecured
debt, which has a low collateral rate. These have been the two basic types of debt
for decades, serving crucial and disparate funding needs [4]. EFCNs allow them to
be modeled using a network formation process.
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By constructing a behavioral model for banks as well as a payment mechanism
compatible with EFCNs, I examine experimentally how the collective debt issued by
lenders can contribute to systemic risk, and how Basel regulations affect this risk. The
model focuses on how the network of obligations among banks changes over time due
to profit-maximizing behavior from banks. There are two stages to bank behavior.
In the first stage, banks choose over a set of heuristic strategies. Specifically, these
strategies include whether to offer secured or unsecured debt as well as how much to
tolerate risk when deciding on investment mix and amount. Once a heuristic strategy
is chosen, it cannot be changed.
In the second stage, banks execute their heuristic strategy by observing market
conditions (such as the cost of funding debt and assets, their own access to funding,
and the demand for debt) and change the mix of cash, debt, and assets they hold
in their investment portfolios in response. Banks borrow from each other in order to
satisfy investment or liquidity needs. This means that the availability of funding as
well as the exposure to risks of default are endogenously generated. As a result of this
behavior, a credit cycle emerges in our model as aggressive banks take on leverage
until creditors become leery of their exposure to risk, and withdraw their credit lines.
This causes either a spate of defaults or a gradual deleveraging, luring creditors to
reopen credit lines, starting the cycle anew.
Similarly to the evaluation of Basel in Chapter II, the effect of regulation can be
broken down into two parts. First, any particular fixed strategy implemented by a
bank will express itself differently in specific actions under the constraints of a new
regulation. This is a mechanical effect that can be seen by introducing regulation into
the model while fixing banks’ choice of heuristic strategy. Second, banks may change
the strategies they employ in response to regulation. To analyze these changes, I use
empirical game-theoretic analysis to find Nash equilibrium strategy profiles.
Overall, results of this analysis indicate that Basel regulations decrease losses on
72
debt, default rates, and interest rate volatility significantly. The effect on profit levels
for banks is mixed. There is some evidence to suggest that Basel induces banks
to shift towards more risky strategy profiles, but the majority of equilibria under
Basel are qualitatively similar to the unregulated ones. It appears that Basel is able
to attenuate the excesses of the credit cycle without inducing a significant strategic
response from banks.
4.1 Introduction
One of the driving forces behind the 2008 financial crisis was the interconnectivity
between banks [39]. The failure of a single bank, for any reason, can influence the
survival of other banks. The failure of Lehman Brothers is the most prominent
example of this in recent history. Directly preceding the crisis, Lehman suffered large
losses due to its exposure to subprime mortgages. But Lehman on its own was not
deemed to control a systemically important amount of assets, and therefore it was
not within the purview of regulators to offer a bailout. This decision ultimately led to
a deepening of the crisis. The network of credit relationships between banks enabled
this deepening in two ways.
First, since other banks were depending on payments owed to them by Lehman to
continue operations, many had difficulties meeting obligations to their own creditors.
Some of these banks were not able to meet all of their own obligations, in turn
causing some of their creditors to become financially stressed. This phenomenon is
called financial contagion , and it propagates through tangible debt obligations
that must be repaid on penalty of default. These debt obligations are collectively
called the interbank debt network in this chapter.
Second, the same market conditions that led to the failure of Lehman Brothers
caused creditors to revise upwards their assessments of the risk of holding debt from
each other. In addition, Lehman Brothers themselves could no longer provide credit.
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Thus, right as banks needed emergency funding, it became more expensive (or impos-
sible) to borrow funds. This phenomenon is dubbed a credit freeze . Credit freezes
take place on the network of potential debt contracts at terms set by lenders. These
potential contracts are called credit lines in this chapter, and collectively they form
the interbank credit network . It represents the confidence that lenders have that
debt will be repaid.
The leverage cycle models employed in Chapter II predict that small external
shocks to asset prices can produce amplified swings due to a differential proclivity
among market participants to take leverage. This story fits quite well with what
happened in the subprime mortgage market that was responsible for Lehman’s initial
troubles. But in these leverage cycle models, banks interact with each other only
through transactions in an asset market. Without explicit treatment of dynamics
in the credit market, important systemic risks such as credit freezes and financial
contagion are overlooked.
In this chapter I rectify this by modeling the formation of both of the interbank
debt network and interbank credit network within the EFCN framework. Both net-
works form as a result of decisions that banks make to maximize profits. In particular,
banks strategize over how and to what extent to manage investment risk. Each bank’s
profit is a function of actions taken by all other banks in a complex, networked en-
vironment. Periodically, the collective actions of all banks produce credit freezes and
financial contagion. This model provides an opportunity to evaluate the effect on
financial stability that Basel has on a dynamic, strategically reactive debt market.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 covers some basic
concepts of credit dynamics captured in the new model. In Section 4.3 I describe
specific processes incorporated in the credit cycle model and explain some of its
dynamics. I then introduce EFCNs and various notation used throughout the rest
of the chapter in Section 4.4. Particulars of the credit cycle agent-based model are
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specified in Section 4.5. I present experimental setup and results in Section 4.6.
Finally, I summarize findings in Section 4.7.
4.2 Background: credit dynamics
Banks and other financial institutions deploy massive resources to make sure that
their risk profile fits that of their management and investors. Yet disastrous phenom-
ena like financial contagion and credit freeze have happened repeatedly in recent his-
tory. Some prominent policymakers have advocated modeling the complex network
of relationships between banks for answers to this conundrum [39]. Subsequently,
economists have developed models using techniques from network theory that focus
mostly on analyzing financial contagion.
Financial contagion A common strategy for modeling contagion is to fix either
the debt network or the credit network and theorize about how a stylized version
of the financial system may cause defaults and contagion. This approach has the
advantage of being analytically tractable and establishes some important baselines.
Roughly speaking, the mechanism for contagion in these models is for a borrower to
default due to an unforeseen demand for liquid assets, or a liquidity shock , leaving
creditors with a loss that may cause them to default as well, and so on. A classic
example comes from Allen and Gale [2]. These authors find that a fixed, complete
(i.e., fully connected and infinite capacity) credit line network facilitates an egalitarian
response to deposit shocks and decreases the size of shock needed to trigger contagion
compared to an incomplete network where some banks do not offer credit lines to
each other. Another result due to Acemoglu et al. [1] fixes a debt network. In that
model, the robustness of complete debt networks drops sharply beyond a certain
shock magnitude threshold.
To date, analytically tractable models have been able to incorporate only the most
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basic features of real financial networks. Gale and Allen assume deposits are shared
among connected banks, meaning credit lines must be reciprocal and (functionally)
infinite in capacity. Acemoglu et al. restrict attention to debt networks with reciprocal
edges and uniform debt sizes. Banks in these models have a binary relation with other
banks (trust for infinity or zero credit, borrow a set amount or not). Thus, the graph
models are unweighted, and unable to capture degrees and direction of dependence.
This is where the expressivity of EFCNs, which allow for credit lines with arbitrary
capacity and debt contracts with flexible terms, can shine.
Credit freeze In contrast to contagion, which is tied to the debt network, credit
freezes depend crucially on the available terms for potential debt in the credit network.
These terms are a response to evolving market conditions, so the fixed debt network
models used to evaluate financial contagion are inadequate. Instead, the motivations
of lenders must be carefully examined and modeled. There have been many empiri-
cal studies documenting credit freeze during the financial crisis [34]. There is widely
available evidence that liquidity management was the source of the credit shortage, as
banks with more illiquid assets on their balance sheet decreased lending by more [16].
Theoretical models point to uncertainty in asset markets and borrower solvency as
explanations for credit drying up [63]. Gorton and Metrick [29] cite increased collat-
eral requirements during the crisis as a major reason for credit freeze. Note that none
of these studies model interbank credit lines explicitly; debt is instead handled using
a monolithic market mechanism.
In my model I include liquidity management, uncertainty over borrower quality,
and the volatility of asset values as drivers of credit freeze. I model credit line forma-
tion so that the interbank credit network is made explicit. As a result, a unique driver
of credit freeze arises: when one bank decides to decrease the amount it wants to lend
out, other banks see a decrease in the maximum they may invest, which induces them
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to decrease the credit they extend as well. The opposing effect is also true, resulting
in temporary credit bubbles.
Towards dynamic network models Network models are particularly appealing
for modeling the financial system because several phenomena observed in the last
financial crisis can be modeled. The interbank debt and credit networks both may
include pairs of banks that know nothing about each other and have no direct credit
or debt relationship. Yet they can still influence each other indirectly through the
network. Even if somehow the entire network were known to every bank, extracting
the relevant information to manage risk is still a hard problem that is beyond current
financial practice. It is conceivable that the incongruity between the risk practices of
banks and the reality of systemic risks in the financial system is due to this opaqueness
of network information. Financial contagion is an example of this gap in practice.
If banks were aware of how the state of the network affected their own profit, they
could gauge how exposed they were to contagion and take the appropriate measures.
But because the true network is not known, default cascades are not checked and can
take banks by surprise.
Another way for crisis to happen in network models with risk-aware banks is when
systemic risks are not adequately represented in the banks’ profit. Since each bank
can exacerbate or alleviate risks in the network for all other banks, it is possible for
profit-seeking banks to collectively ignore the damage they are doing to the financial
system. If this type of externality happens at equilibrium, then banks can be locked
into a cycle of repeating crises. A game-theoretic analysis of a dynamic model can
reveal this path to crisis.
The model I develop in this chapter models banks as profit-seeking enterprises
while incorporating the complexity of interbank debt and credit network formation.
Banks make decisions at the most granular level: evaluating whether or not to lend
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or borrow from specific counterparties. This granularity gives rise to macro-level
phenomena naturally, and enables the macroeconomic response to regulation to have
foundations in the intricate profit-seeking behavior of banks. However, this type
of model demands that bank decisions be made in an extremely high dimensional
action space, so a behavioral model is needed to specify reasonable bank reactions
to market conditions. In turn, empirical game theoretical analysis must be used to
bring the behavioral model to equilibrium. I use this approach to create a rich credit
cycle model incorporating both credit freeze and financial contagion that offers new
perspectives on the efficacy of Basel regulations.
4.3 Credit cycle overview
As in the Allen and Gale model, N banks each operate in their own region with
a specific set of retail customers. These customers put their savings into banks as
deposits , effectively creating debt that the bank must repay on demand. Every
period a random amount of deposits will either be created (signifying consumers
putting more cash into a bank) or withdrawn (signifying consumers withdrawing
their cash from banks). The inability of banks to honor large withdrawals is a major
reason for default.
A bank’s business is to take cheap forms of funding (such as deposits) and trans-
form them into higher-yield investments. Two investments are available: assets
which represent readily purchasable but illiquid securities, and interbank debt which
are contracts between banks to exchange currently available funding for interest and
repayment in the future. Both types of investment are funded using a combination
of interbank debt, retail deposits, and the bank’s own capital.
Assets have high expected return, but also high volatility of returns. They require
payment in the current period, and offer a random, unknown payoff in the next period.
They lose value if liquidated to make payments before the next period comes. Asset
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liquidation is the most expensive way to make payments, and can lead to insolvency.
All properties of the distribution of asset returns are public knowledge, and
throughout this chapter I assume an infinite supply of assets, with price normalized
to 1 (so that k units of asset costs k dollars). Notice that asset prices in this model
do not change as a result of bank demand, as they do in the leverage cycle model in
Chapter II. So the sale and purchase of assets does not have a direct effect on other
banks; rather it serves as a catalyst for interesting debt and credit network dynamics.
This choice makes the causal link between interbank debt dynamics and the economic
findings in Section 4.6 more clear, especially as some of these findings mirror results
from the leverage cycle literature which highlights asset market dynamics.
An alternative to buying assets is to loan other banks money by extending credit
lines . Creditors use these to express terms at which a they are willing to accept
a borrower’s debt. Debt issued on these lines is subordinate to deposits, so that
in the event of a default, deposits will always be paid before interbank debt. In
the work of Allen and Gale, as well as in numerous subsequent models of financial
contagion, banks are connected to each other via static, homogeneous credit lines.
My model departs from this treatment significantly, as credit lines originate from
efforts by creditors to procure debt as an investment. Specifically, banks estimate
and compare the return and return variance on debt versus assets, and construct an
expected utility-maximizing portfolio. But while the the asset’s stochastic properties
are assumed to be known, those of debt are not analytically tractable and must be
approximated throughout the simulation. In addition, debt is not readily available for
purchase as assets are. Instead, creditors must adjust their offerings based on market
conditions, in the hope of achieving their investment goal. For these two reasons,
the market for debt does not naturally come to an equilibrium. Instead, creditors
are given a set of heuristic strategies to choose from and the model is solved, using
EGTA, for a Nash equilibrium in the set of strategies.
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When borrowers utilize credit lines and pay back their debt with interest in the
next period, then the credit line has paid off as an investment. If a borrower defaults,
then the creditor loses part of its principal determined by the collateral rate on the
credit line, and the credit line has yielded a negative return. An unused credit line
corresponds to zero return. Both collateral rate and interest rate are properties of
the credit line, and are set by creditors in a competitive environment.
Finally, banks can keep deposits in the form of cash, forgoing investment returns
entirely. This shields them from investment risk, and also preserves their ability
to make required payments (such as returning cash to depositors) in a universally
accepted currency. Forcing banks to maintain cash reserves is a major regulatory
pillar that will be implemented in the model.
Banks in this model are heterogeneous in the following ways:
1. Their depositors are different, which means each bank gets a different liquidity
shock each period.
2. They differ in their investment preferences, and thus their targeted portfolios
have different mixes of debt and assets.
3. The set of fellow banks they extend credit to differs (but may overlap), and the
terms at which they extend credit is chosen according to differing policies.
2) and 3) together provide the basis for a debt market . 2) splits the population
of banks into borrowers and lenders. The typical borrower uses credit lines in order to
buy assets, while the typical lender issues credit lines in order to receive stable interest
income. 3) results in competition between creditors for a limited pool of available
debt investments. The fact that creditors do not consider every potential borrower
during every period is a substantial assumption. It stems from the fact that creditors
in the real world must bear the cost of evaluating and maintaining relationships with
80
institutional borrowers. Therefore, there is some stickiness in the process for which
borrowers are considered for credit lines.
The modeled debt market described in Section 4.5.6 is a heuristic for allocating
debt at set terms to banks who wish to invest in debt. It is not economically efficient
or strategically stable, but it allows for a large, realistic set of debt investment options.
Every credit line is considered an investment by the issuing bank, and therefore the
terms of each credit line are updated according to investment needs.
4.3.1 Payments on EFCNs and the balance sheet
A unique aspect of this model, enabled by the use of EFCNs to encode debt and
credit relations, is that it considers exchanges of debt that are made possible by
intermediaries . Consider the following scenario:
Suppose there are three banks A, B, and C. They each extend a credit line of
five dollars to each other, so that each has access to ten dollars of credit. Let A have
five dollars of cash, B have five dollars, and C ten dollars. Suppose A wants to make
a payment of twenty dollars to its depositors. It can immediately pay fifteen using
its ten dollars in credit from B and C and its own cash. This leaves B and A with
zero dollars, and C with five dollars. C is unwilling to lend these last five dollars to
A to complete the payment. But B can intermediate by borrowing five dollars from
C using its own credit line, and lending those five dollars to A. A can incentivize B
to do this by offering a higher interest rate than B pays C. The opportunity for B
to intermediate is created by the fact that C isn’t willing to lend out all its cash to
one party. Unlike in previous work, these opportunities are abundant in our model,
where credit lines are issued based on profitability.
All of these payments between banks with and without intermediaries, and using
either credit or debt, are handled naturally by an EFCN. The overall structure of
the EFCN, and the way in which it reflects a bank’s balance sheet during a liquidity
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shock, is depicted in Figure 4.1. A payment to depositors through an intermediary is
also shown.
Bank Capital Deposits Cash Assets Debt
1 10 100 10 100 0
2 10 100 20 90 0












(a) Initial EFCN. Each bank holds 100 in deposits, which they have
invested in varying amounts of assets and cash. Banks extend credit
lines to each other in different amounts.
Bank Capital Deposits Cash Assets Debt
1 10 50 0 100 40
2 10 100 0 90 -20













(b) FCN after Bank 1 pays its depositors back 50 dollars. Bank 2 lends
all of its 20 dollars in cash, and facilitates the lending of another 20
dollars of Bank 3’s cash, to Bank 1.
Figure 4.1: Financial credit networks before and after a liquidity shock of 50 dollars.
Arrows indicate credit lines. An arrow from x to y with marking x/y denotes a credit
line with capacity y and utilization x. The direction of payment flow is against the
direction of arrows.
While it may seem that intermediaries are not readily observed or regulated, in
reality the sale of a complex debt instrument is functionally equivalent to explicit
intermediation. Although the correspondence is not one-to-one, the real life debt
network is certainly highly influenced by intermediate lenders and borrowers. Inter-
mediated transactions generate more aggregate debt, which has implications on the
level of financial contagion that happens in the event of a default.
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4.3.2 The credit cycle
While there are many moving parts in the credit cycle model, its namesake emerges
as a fairly consistent dynamic process. At the start of the model, banks invest in a
differential manner according to their risk tolerance. For aggressive banks, this means
borrowing on the interbank market to buy risky assets. For conservative banks, this
means extending credit lines, which are not perceived to be risky, and conserving
cash. Over time, creditors adapt to market conditions so that they offer credit lines
that are utilized by borrowers, at interest rates that they are willing to pay. Cheaper
secured debt is used by all banks to deal with deposit shocks, providing liquidity for a
pledge of illiquid assets. Higher-interest unsecured debt is used to increase investment
by taking leverage.
Eventually, a large asset shock causes damage to the balance sheets of relatively
aggressive borrowers, which have accumulated large amounts of capital by taking more
leverage. A default may happen, and its ensuing contagion spreads. Or borrowers
may be able to avert catastrophe. Regardless, interest rates skyrocket as creditors
revise default risk upwards, making leverage-funded investment less attractive. The
entire system undergoes deleveraging until balance sheets recover, and the cycle starts
again.
A key feature of bank behavior is that they are constantly monitoring the prof-
itability of investing in debt versus assets. For assets this means monitoring the
interest rates paid for buying assets on leverage, and for debt this means monitoring
credit line capacities and default rates. If interest rates become high, banks will shift
their investment towards debt and if interest rates are low or default rates are high,
they will buy assets. During a crisis, the cost of buying assets increases as interest
rates rise, which discourages banks from investing. Meanwhile, during boom years
assets purchases become cheap to fund as interest rates fall due to lower perceived
borrower risk. The credit cycle is powered by this profit-seeking behavior by creditors.
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Basel regulation enters fairly naturally into the model as an additional constraint
on leverage taken by banks. It imposes a constraint that is more stringent the higher
the weighted (by capital) average estimated default rate is.
4.4 Extended FCNs
The FCNs developed in Chapter III are a natural modeling tool for representing
interbank network dynamics. Credit edges in an FCN correspond to an offer to invest
in a specific borrower’s debt at a specific interest rate, up to a limit. Once a set of
these offers/credit edges have been established, banks can use them as a source of
funding for any payments they choose to make. These payments generate debt edges
which are also encoded in the FCN, representing obligations to repay current funding
in the future. Collectively, debt edges map to the debt networks which are used in
the literature to study financial contagion.
Interest payments are an important pricing tool for banks, but perhaps equally
important is the collateral rate. This sets the amount of a loan that the lender
recovers in the event that the borrower defaults. Since default is the only risk to
lenders, loans at different collateral rates are extremely differentiated products with
macroeconomic ramifications. One way to see this is that the aggregate collateral
required by lenders defines a leverage limit on the financial system. This leverage
limit constrains investment and thus decreases exposure to risky assets. In fact,
lenders perform a similar function to regulators by setting collateral rates to limit
their exposure to default risk. Endogenously set collateral rates interact with the
leverage limits set by regulators to create an overall tolerance for leverage in the
financial system.
From the borrower side, credit lines with different collateral requirements require-
ments are qualitatively different funding opportunities. At the extreme, if a collateral
rate of one hundred percent is required on a credit line, borrowing is simply a way
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to access liquidity using assets that may be difficult or costly to unload immediately.
No leverage is taken, at all in this case. On the other hand, a collateral rate of zero
is an opportunity to increase leverage and invest more than would be possible other-
wise. So borrowers have an entirely different set of considerations in choosing which
collateral requirements to take on.
In order to incorporate collateral requirements into a model of credit network
formation, FCNs must be extended to include collateral requirements. This extension
leads to the construction of a richer payment mechanism where banks choose between
debt options at different collateral rates, detailed in Section 4.5.3. It also introduces
richness in lending strategy, as banks can set rates according to market conditions and
consider how much collateral to require on their loans. This is done given estimates
of each borrower’s risk of default.
4.4.1 Extended FCNs: notation
To handle realistic debt contracts, the original FCN framework from Chapter III
must be extended with collateral rates. To do so, we will use the following set of
notation.
An EFCN is represented by a tuple (V,E) where V is a set of nodes indexed by
{1, . . . , N} and E is a set of edges on V . The following functions allow agents to
access important characteristics of nodes and edges.
• τ : E → {debt , credit} is the type of the edge.
• C : E → R+ denotes the edge’s capacity . For credit edges, this is the amount
that may be borrowed. For debt edges, this is the amount of the debt.
• R : E → R+ is the edge’s interest rate. For credit, this is the rate at which the
lender is willing to lend, or the contract rate. For debt, this is the agreed-upon
rate for the debt contract.
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• CR : E → R+ is the edge’s collateral rate. For credit edges this specifies, per
unit borrowed, how much capital must be set aside as collateral to be seized
by the creditor in case the borrower cannot repay its debt. For debt, it is the
collateral rate agreed upon at the time of issuance.
• DR : V → R+ is the default rate of the node. D̂R : V → R+ is an estimated
default rate.
I slightly overload notation and sometimes refer to DR(e) or D̂R(e) with e ∈ E.
This will be understood to mean the default rate of the borrower for either credit or
debt edges.
As far as the basic difference between EFCNs and FCNs, the function CR is the
only one. But we will see that this simple addition has large ramifications in terms
of the model we may build as well as how payment mechanisms must be constructed.
4.4.2 Nodes as banks: notation
The original FCNs considered interest payments to be the only way of receiv-
ing returns by holding debt. In our EFCN-based model, creditors value debt more
realistically in two ways. First, the ex-ante default rate of the borrower can be es-
timated and used to help creditors decide on what terms to offer. Second, creditors
can set a collateral rate which controls losses on defaults for themselves, and imposes
a constraint on how borrowers use capital. To include these two factors, payment
mechanisms on EFCNs must allow for asymmetrical valuations of debt by borrowers
and creditors. To see this, consider a single piece of debt e ∈ E. The creditor must
worry about losing the value of the debt in the event of default. Meanwhile, the bor-
rower values the debt only insofar as it allows it to achieve a payment. Default is a
catastrophic event for the borrower, but it has no impact on how it values the cost of
using e. A similar asymmetry between creditors and borrowers exists when gauging
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the value of the collateral rate on debt. In light of this, we define two functions to
access the value of using edges to make payments. See Section 4.5.3 for details.
• DR : V → R+ is the default rate of the node.
• Val in : E → R is the debt value of receiving a payment on a particular edge.
• Valout : E → R is the debt value of making a payment on a particular edge.
For our purposes, it will be convenient to also refer to payer and receiver banks:
• Payer : E → V returns the node which can utilize an edge to make a payment.
For a credit edge, this is the borrower (by issuing debt), and for a debt edge
this is the creditor (by debt cancellation).
• Receiver : E → V returns the node which can receive a payment on a particular
edge. For a credit edge, this is the creditor (who receives the borrower’s debt),
and for a debt edge this is the borrower (who can have its debt cancelled).
We define the following edge subsets for convenience. With v ∈ V :
• Out c(v) are credit edges where v is the lender, Outd(v) are debt edges where v
is the borrower, and Out(v) is Out c(v) ∪ Outd(v). Thus Out(v) consists of all
edges that can be used to pay v.
• Inc(v) are credit edges where v is the borrower, Ind(v) are debt edges where v
is the lender, and In(v) is Inc(v)∪ Ind(v). Thus In(v) consists of all edges that
v can use to pay other nodes.
Banks in this model do not always have perfect information. For uncertain quan-
tities X, estimates are often used, and are denoted by X̂. Notable estimated quan-
tities are the default rate D̂R and the expected debt values Ê(Val in) and Ê(Valout),
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where E is the standard notation for the expected value, and Ê is an approximation
of the expected value.
Finally, in every EFCN discussed in this chapter, there is a market node that
accepts payments for deposit shocks and assets. All other nodes in the graph (rep-
resenting banks), offer a credit edge with unlimited capacity, zero interest, and zero
collateral rate to the market node. Debt issued by the market node can be interpreted
as cash , since it is completely liquid and is accepted by all banks as payment. None
of the credit edges issued to the market node are included in the In and Out subsets,
and the market node is not counted within the N bank nodes.
4.5 Credit cycle model environment and bank behavior
The credit cycle model will consist of banks alternating between making invest-
ment decisions, including issuing credit lines, and seeing their investments play out.
Each cycle is called a period, and the model ends after T periods. T is chosen to be
large enough so that interesting dynamics may play out.
4.5.1 Model schedule
During the investment phase , each bank prepares a balance sheet according to
targets set in the last period, and updates targets for the next period based on new
observed returns. Targets are distinguished from actual achieved balance sheet values
using brackets 〈〉. An EFCN consisting of credit lines is originated in this phase, to
be utilized for all payments during the rest of the period.
1. Check every bank for overleveraging. See Section 4.5.2.
2. Purchase asset amounts Akt according to target amount 〈Akt 〉 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} in random order.
3. Update default rate estimates D̂R(k), for all k. See Section 4.5.4 for details.
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4. Set asset investment target 〈Akt+1〉, debt investment target 〈
∑
e∈Ind(k)t+1 C(e)〉,
and target cash reserve amount 〈mkt+1〉. This requires updating estimates for
the cost of funding, asset/debt returns, and the volatility of asset/debt returns.
It also entails requesting credit from other banks. See Section 4.5.6 for details.
5. Each bank issues credit according to their own target debt investment level
〈
∑
e∈Ind(k)t+1 C(e)〉, credit requests made by other banks, and their own credit
allocation strategy. Credit lines from last period expire. Details in Section 4.5.6.
6. Update all debt valuations for every edge. This includes updating collateral
values. Create debt valuation clusters for use in payment algorithm. See Sec-
tion 4.5.3.
7. End the iteration, t← t+ 1.
During the capital update phase , the balance sheets and the EFCN constructed
during the investment phase are shocked stochastically. Debt is also repaid in this
phase with interest. All potential default events happen during this phase.
1. A deposit shock for each bank is generated, and if necessary payments are made
to depositors. After the shock, debt valuations are updated.
2. Debt is repaid with interest. Debt valuations are then updated.
3. υt is generated, and the new asset value A
k
t−1υt is returned to bank k as cash.
Debt valuations are then updated. See Section 4.5.7 for details on υt.
4.5.2 Bank state and balance sheet













mkt is cash, A
k
t is assets, w
k
t is capital , h is an asset liquidity haircut , and d
k
t is
deposits. Banks start with an initial endowment of winit , and initial deposits of dinit ,
which is all granted in cash. A bank must maintain certain conditions on its balance
sheet in order to continue operations, as described below.




that are overleveraged cannot meet all of their collateral requirements, and thus do
not have further access to credit. Typically, banks become overleveraged when their
assets lose value. They are particularly susceptible to this when they choose to borrow
close to their leverage limit in search of returns.
Banks can default in two ways: becoming insolvent or failing to pay a debt.
These events are described below.
Insolvency A bank that owes more than its total asset value (equivalently, has











C(e) < 0. (4.2)
There are three main ways for banks to lose capital.
1. Assets can lose value.
2. A large deposit shock can cause the bank to liquidate assets at a loss.
3. A borrower can default on their debt and never repay it.
Payment failure If at any point a bank cannot honor its depositors’ random with-
drawals, or cannot pay back its interbank debts with interest, then it defaults. Over-
leveraging is a common root cause of this failure, as banks with access to credit can
access the liquidity of creditor banks to pay off shocks and debt. Overleveraged banks,
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however, have only their own cash and assets that, if liquidated, must be sold at a
loss.
Consequences of default A defaulted bank first pays back its collateral to the
best of its ability. It is then forced to be inactive for a set number of periods ε, after
which it is reset to an initial state in which it is forgiven of all debt, and granted winit
and dinit .
Note that there is a growing literature on handling default as an endogenous
decision, and settling payments between defaulting banks simultaneously in financial
networks. For example, Schuldenzucker et al. [58] explore the simultaneous clearing
of default swap obligations. This layer of complexity is largely omitted from this
model and we only consider sequential defaults.
4.5.3 Debt valuation
A key feature of EFCNs is the ability for banks to set both interest rates and
collateral rates on credit lines. In addition, banks are aware that a portion of the
debt owed them will not be paid back, and estimate default rates to account for this.
These features distinguish EFCNs from FCNs, and require that each bank be able to
make a more complex calculation for the value of debt. Creditors need this value to
judge the value of debt as an investment and set terms, and debtors need it in order
to choose which credit lines to utilize. All banks need this value to decide whether to
participate in a payment chain. Values can be negative, signifying the cost of utilizing
debt, or positive, signifying the value of receiving debt.
In this section we specify Val in and Valout , functions that return the value per
unit of debt utilizing edge e. If τ(e) = credit , then a borrower needs to know Valout(e)
the cost for the act of borrowing, and a creditor needs Val in(e), value for the act of
holding debt as an investment. If τ(e) = debt , then a creditor must have Valout(e),
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cost for the act of debt cancellation and a borrower must have Val in(e), the value
for having its debt cancelled. Val in(e) returns the value of receiving a payment on
edge e, and Valout returns the cost of making a payment.
First, we examine the debt valuation problem from a creditor’s point of view,
receiving a unit payment on credit edge e and considering what Val in(e) should be.
The return on the resulting debt if the debtor does not default is R(e). The re-
turn if the debtor does default is −(1 − CR(e)). Let the estimated default rate
of the borrower be DRB = D̂R(Payer(e)). Then the estimated expected return
is −DRB(1 − CR(e)) + (1 − DRB)R(e). So Ê(Val in(e)) takes this value when
τ(e) = credit . Here Ê denotes an estimated expected value, since the default rate
used in this calculation is not exact. This is explained in Section 4.5.2. This is the
value of receiving debt from a borrower on credit edge e. It is also the cost to the
creditor for canceling an existing debt owed it (as in when routing a payment). So
Ê(Valout(e)) also takes this value when τ(e) = debt .
Now consider a borrower utilizing a credit edge. It will have to fulfill two promises:
pay the interest rate R(e) and commit to maintaining enough collateral at rate CR(e).
Intuitively, having to commit more collateral is costly, as it hampers investment
flexibility. But a collateral requirement that is lax enough will not cost the borrower
anything, as it does not constrain the execution of her investment plan. Call the value
of the collateral pledged towards a unit of debt on edge e CV (e) : E → R. This can be
positive or negative depending on how high the collateral rate is. Ultimately, the cost
of the collateral requirement depends on whether the borrower’s investment goals are
achieved. It is impossible to consider all of the environmental and strategic factors
that contribute to this success or failure, so for this model I use an approximation.
Start with the borrower’s investment target :





Target is bank k’s preferred amount of total investment. Let the expected rate of
return on this investment be Ωkt . Taking on debt at a stringent collateral rate can cost
bank k investment returns if Target is not achieved. To find out if this is the case, the
first baseline to establish is whether or not the investment target is realistic to achieve,
overall. We can do this by calculating the maximum investment possible with current
levels of capital. Define mDebtkt =
∑
e∈Ind(vkt )
C(e)(1 + R(e)), the debt payments
owed to node k at time t + 1. Then the maximum investment is approximately the




t−1 in addition to the amount of credit
accessible given current levels of capital wkt−1. Call the sum of these quantities the
max payment in period t for bank k, Πkt . If Π
k
t > Target , then the investment
target is feasible . The baseline expectation for feasible targets is that they will be
achieved, so stringent collateral requirements will contribute a negative debt value
but lax collateral requirements will be viewed as not affecting debt value. Meanwhile,
the baseline expectation for infeasible targets (i.e., Πkt < Target) is that the they
will not be achieved, so lax collateral requirements will contribute positive debt value
while stringent ones will be viewed as not affecting debt value.
We rely on two assumptions to calculate the impact on debt value of a particular
collateral rate.
Assumption IV.1 (Linear interpolation). CV (e) is constant for a particular bank
and period, and thus does not depend on the amount borrowed, X. Therefore, λX is
the total collateral value of borrowing X > 0 dollars, for constant λ > 0.
So given an edge e, two amounts borrowed X and Y , and their corresponding total
collateral values A and B, a valid equality under this assumption is that CV (e) =
A−B
X−Y . Since linear interpolation doesn’t hold exactly, the collateral value we calculate
using this equality is an approximation, and is thus denoted by ĈV (e).
To see why linear interpolation is an approximation, note that taking on any single
collateral requirement (no matter how stringent or lax) at a low borrowed amount is
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likely to be inconsequential to the final investment amount achieved. So CV (e) = 0
for many small debts, but increases as the debt amount increases.
The second assumption we make is that credit lines are usable to make payments.
Assumption IV.2 (Creditor Liquidity). The feasible payment level Πkt is achievable
using a combination of credit and cash.
In reality, not all creditors have enough access to liquidity to help borrowers
make investments. In our calculation of the maximum payment, we also refrain from
including assets that may be liquidated at a loss or debt that may be exchanged or
canceled because these are investments that should only be liquidated in emergencies.
Now we have the ingredients necessary to estimate CV (e). The strategy will be to
first note that the total collateral value of utilizing zero dollars on edge e is 0. Then,
we will calculate the total collateral value of utilizing all available capital wkt−1 at the
collateral rate of CR(e). This total value will be calculated in several different ways
depending on the bank’s funding situation as compared to their investment goals.
Finally, we will use linear interpolation to calculate ĈV (e).
First, imagine we have a feasible target, so that the bank expects to achieve
its investment target. Consider a credit line e with collateral rate CR(e). If the
bank used all of its available capital wkt as collateral to borrow at collateral rate
CR(e), it would end up investing the amount wkt /CR(e). If w
k
t−1/CR(e) > Target ,
the bank keeps ĈV (e) = 0, since using the credit line keeps it at its baseline of
achieving its investment target. The bank would actually be on track to invest more
than its target, but it does not prefer to do so, and thus assigns no extra value to
the lax collateral terms. However, if wkt /CR(e) < Target then the bank is losing
out on Target − wkt /CR(e) in investment amount and Ωkt (Target − wkt /CR(e)) in
investment returns. So we have that at a utilization amount of 0, the total collateral
value is 0, but at a utilization amount of wkt /CR(e), the total collateral value is
Ωkt (Target − wkt /CR(e)). Using linear interpolation, we stipulate that the estimated
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Now suppose instead that the target is infeasible, so that the bank expects to
achieve at best an investment level of Πkt < Target . Then for a credit edge e with






Note that if (wkt−1/CR(e) − Πkt ) < 0, the bank assigns a penalty to using the credit
edge, as the collateral rate is below the rate required to invest Πkt . There is no scenario
where a collateral constraint is valueless, as the bank which cannot ever achieve its
investment goal is always desperate for more collateral.
Finally, consider the collateral value for cancelling debt. When debt edge e is can-
celled, bank k = Receiver(e) receives some collateral back from its creditor Payer(e).
The value of this collateral for bank k depends on how it is used to achieve bank k’s
investment target. If Πkt > Target , the extra wealth has no investment value since the
target is already achieved. Otherwise, the wealth can be used to increase Πkt to be
closer to Target . Let (Πkt )CR(e) be the maximum payment achievable by bank k given






So our collateral value function ĈV : E → R+, which is the value that having
collateral rate CR(e) contributes for utilizing one unit of new debt, is the following






, if Πkt < Target
0, if Πkt > Target and w
k





and for τ(e) = debt:
ĈV (e) =

0, if Πkt > Target
Ωkt [(Π
k
t )CR(e) − (Πkt )], otherwise
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Now we can sum up the two debt valuation functions. For edge e, k = Receiver(e),
and recalling DRB = DR(Payer(e)):
Ê(Val in(e)) =

(1−DRB)R(e)−DRB(1− CR(e)), if τ(e) = credit
R(e) + ĈV (e), if τ(e) = debt
Ê(Valout(e)) =

−(R(e) + ĈV (e)), if τ(e) = credit
−(1−DRB)R(e) +DRB(1− CR(e)), if τ(e) = debt
4.5.4 Default rate estimation
A bank can default in several ways, outlined in Section 4.5.2. Out of these,
insolvency represents the greatest danger to creditors since creditors take losses on
their debt when borrowers default due to insolvency. Given that the asset return
distribution is known to be lognormal, we can calculate in closed form an approximate
insolvency rate. We want the probability that the bank capital of bank k is below
zero:










C(e) < 0) (4.3)










The CDF of υt is known, so this probability may be calculated to estimate the
insolvency rate, which in turn can be used as an estimate of the default rate for any
bank given their balance sheet information. This estimate D̂R(k) is publicly available
to all banks.
D̂R is an underestimate of insolvency, as it only considers asset return shocks. It
misses financial contagion effects completely, and also fails to capture capital losses
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due to asset liquidation. Its purpose is to provide banks with a simple, actionable
insight that requires only balance sheet information, which in the real world is read-
ily available. In contrast, financial contagion estimation requires knowledge of the
entire debt network, and asset liquidation prediction requires knowing the maximum
payment a bank can make. The former is not public knowledge in this model or in
reality, and the latter requires knowing intimate details about each bank’s access to
credit.
4.5.5 Payments
Making payments in EFCNs requires a new payment mechanism with newly
thought out desiderata. For a payment of X dollars from node s to t in an EFCN to
succeed, we require that it must consist of payment paths that satisfy the following
properties.
1. The paying bank (source) loses P dollars immediately, and the paid bank (des-
tination) gains P dollars.
2. All intermediary banks net a positive debt valuation , as defined in Sec-
tion 4.5.3.
3. All new debt contracts on any credit edge pay at least the contract interest rate,
but possibly higher.
4. No bank k in the transaction has
∑
e∈Ind(k)




CR(e)C(e) ≤ wkt before the transaction.
Apart from property 2 and 4, these are all equivalent to conditions satisfied by
payment paths in FCNs as described in Chapter III. In words, property 4 stipu-
lates that any bank that was not overleveraged before a payment path is executed
cannot become overleveraged after execution. Overleveraging and its consequences
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are described in Section 4.5.2. Preventing overleveraging guarantees that every bank
maintains enough collateral to pay back its creditors if it defaults.
Property 2 is similar to the interest rate monotonicity property in the original
FCNs, but with one key difference. Interest rates are a universal valuation for debt
accepted by all agents. Debt valuations, on the other hand, are not universal. In fact,
for a single piece of debt, the creditor and the borrower will generally differ in how
they value it. The interpretation for interest rate markups in EFCNs is that they are
payments made to smooth out differences in debt valuations along payment paths.
Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP must be modified to handle these changes and pro-
duce valid payments. Recall that in the original FCNs, Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP
chose from a set of interest rates with limited cardinality. Similarly, Algorithm
MaxDebtValueFlowLP will choose from a set of debt values of limited cardinality,
DV . Recall that flow variables in Algorithm MaxInterestFlowLP consisted of an edge
on which to route the flow as well as an interest rate at which to route the flow. This
setup is modified slightly here, as we instead consider flow variables to pairs of edges
and debt values to the receiver of the flow. This is an arbitrary choice, as setting
this value fixes the interest rate paid on the flow, and also fixes the value paid by the
sender of the flow.
Define ValClust : R × {sending, receiving} → R as taking a tuple (v, s) and
returning the closest member of DV that is greater than v if s = receiving and the
closest member of DV that is smaller than v otherwise.
In addition, define the functions IRVal : R × E → R, ValIR : R × E → R, and
SendVal : R× e→ R as follows:
IRVal(v, e) =
(v + (1− CR(e))D̂R(e))
1− D̂R(e)
(4.5)
ValIR(ir, e) = ValClust(ir + CV (e), sending) (4.6)
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∀e ∈ E†, τ(e) = credit,∀DV ∈ DVs.t. IRVal(DV ) < r(e) or
DV < Val in(e) : fe,DV = 0
∀e ∈ E†, τ(e) = iou,∀DV ∈ DV 6= ValIR(r(e)) : fe,DV = 0
(Valid Interest Rates)
∀e ∈ E†,DV : 0 ≤ fe,DV ,∀e : 0 ≤ fe ≤ c(e) (Capacity)
To make payments, one can simply write down a tuple (X, s, t) representing the
amount to route X, payer s and destination t. This is the basic payment algorithm
used throughout, and produces payments consisting of valid payment paths. Max
flow is achieved if all possible debt valuations are included in DV . Otherwise, some
payments that might have been routed are not, due to the rounding up and down of
true debt valuations to members of DV .
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Note that there are two types of payments in the model: discretionary and
necessary . Buying assets is discretionary as failure to complete the full payment is
inconsequential, so if P is more than the max flow, then the max flow is routed for a
partial payment instead.
On the other hand, payments to depositors and creditors are necessary to contin-
ued operation. For these payments, if X is more than the max flow, then
1. Any non-liquid assets will be liquidated, even at a loss, to attempt to complete
the payment.
2. If there is no way to make the payment, no partial payments are made. Instead,
the appropriate default proceedings will be triggered.
Payment mechanisms Payment mechanisms will implement flows calculated us-
ing Algorithm MaxDebtValueFlowLPȦs a modeling choice, we will replace the ob-
jective in Algorithm MaxDebtValueFlowLP for all our payment mechanisms so that
the debt value lost by s is minimized.
Denote the payment mechanism for necessary payments as Pay : R+ × V × V ×
EFCN → P ∈ P where P is the space of all possible payments (i.e., collections of
payment flows). Pay takes as arguments a tuple (X, s, t, G) and produces a set of
s-t payment paths P = P (1), . . . , P (m) such that the sum of their flows is X. The
mechanism proceeds to route this payment. If a valid P does not exist, then a max
flow payment P will be returned. The bank will proceed to route this payment and
assets will be liquidated at a loss of ρ to pay the difference. If there are not enough
assets, then the bank defaults.
PayAsset : (R+, V, V, EFCN) → P ∈ P is similar, but does not have to route
the full amount X, as it is paying for discretionary investment in assets. It does not
proceed with liquidation if X is not feasible, and just routes the max flow.
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4.5.6 Investment stage
During the investment stage, each bank buys assets, reserves cash, and issues
credit lines to obtain debt investments. To make these decisions, they use a utility
function for guidance.
Utility function At the end of period t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, bank k decides on a
target investment portfolio size λkt+1w
k
t as well as the proportion of the portfolio to
be used on assets, αkt+1. Naturally, the proportion that is reserved for making loans
is 1− αkt . These quantities are chosen by maximizing an estimated constant relative











The risk aversion parameter θk is strategically chosen at the beginning of the
simulation. µa and σa are the known and constant asset return and asset return
variance, respectively. The cost of capital for credit βct , the cost of capital for β
a
t ,
credit return (µct) and credit return variance (σ
c
t ) are unknown, as they depend on
events that transpire during the simulation. They are estimated as described in
Section 4.5.8 Note that µct and σ
c
t are parameters for the entire debt market, and do
not reflect the profitability of lending to any single bank.
The utility function boils down to a preference for high returns at low volatility.
θk governs how the two are balanced for a particular bank. An important assumption
made here is that there is no correlation between asset and credit returns that might
increase or decrease the total return volatility of the portfolio.
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Asset investment The multiplier on capital used to calculate the asset investment





. This quantity is often greater than one, implying
that banks would like to take leverage to buy assets. Cash is required to buy assets,
which can be taken either from mkt or borrowed from other banks. The actual amount
of assets bought is
PayAsset{(λkt )∗(αkt )∗wkt−1, k,Market} = Akt ≤ 〈Akt 〉 = (λkt )∗(αkt )∗wkt−1, (4.9)
with inequality since there may not be enough cash available for bank k to achieve its
investment goal. Remember that PayAsset does not permit k to become overleveraged
as a result of the transaction. For details on the payment mechanism PayAsset , see
Section 4.5.5.
Cash reserves Banks might choose to hold cash reserves for reasons other than
issuing debt. In this model it is actually regulators who mandate that a certain
amount of cash be carried in order to service deposits. They do this by setting
mReserve ∈ [0, 1], dictating the percentage of deposits that must be held in cash.
Credit investment The total amount of debt desired by bank k is (λkt )
∗(1 −
αkt )
∗wkt−1. This debt is obtained by extending credit lines to other banks, and fa-
cilitating payments on these credit lines. To do this, creditors reserve a portion of
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their cash mDebtkt = min{(mkt −mReserve)(1−αkt ), (λkt )∗(1−αkt )∗wkt−1} so that they
can service their credit lines.
In borrowers’ eyes, debt is a commodity and is differentiated only by price. Under
some conditions, economic theory predicts that there should be a single price of debt
established. There are a few reasons that this expectation does not hold in this model.
1. Borrowers have different default rates, which affects the terms on loans.
2. There are two terms on loans that affect value: collateral rate and interest rate.
Lenders may strategize over which to focus on, resulting in differing loan terms.
3. Lenders prefer to offer debt to repeat customers. This modeling choice is in-
spired by the real-life cost of vetting borrowers.
Although the aggregate debt target is set using aggregate return and volatility
estimates, the terms on individual credit lines are adapted using performance data
each borrower. The full policy is a complex heuristic, but it is easy to understand
the basic idea. At the highest level, creditors must decide on the premium that
they charge for each borrower. Remember that the value of debt edge e for creditors
is R(e)DR(Payer(e)) + (1 − R(e))(1 − CR(e)). A higher interest rate or a higher
collateral rate increase value for the creditor, but decrease value for the borrower.
The premium ζ it that creditor i assigns to its credit is thus equal to the value of edge
e ∈ Inc(i):
ζ it = R(e)(1−DR(Payer(e)))− DR((Payer(e)))(1− CR(e)). (4.10)
Each creditor in our model chooses strategically whether to offer secured debt at a
collateral rate of 1 or unsecured debt at a collateral rate of 0 for the duration of model.
This simplification reduces the strategy space, but compromises on profit opportunity
for lenders. In practice lenders can always use interest rate to differentiate their debt
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offerings. In addition, these two types of debt make up the majority of real debt
instruments.
The strategic parameter Ki ∈ {0, 1} is used to specify the collateral rate offered
on all credit lines extended by bank i.
So the terms that are offered on all e ∈ Outc(i) with are fixed as:
R(e) =
ζ it + (1−Ki)DR(Payer(e))
1− DR(Payer(e))
(4.11)
Creditors choose ζ it every period according to market conditions. Roughly, if credit
lines are fully utilized then the creditor will explore increasing the premium in order
to make more profit. Conversely, if credit lines are lightly utilized then the creditor









The specific update rule for ζ it is to set a threshold parameter UT and parameters
UpPrem, DownPrem. When U i > UT , ζ it = ζ
i
t−1 ∗ UpPrem. Otherwise, ζ it = ζ it−1 ∗
DownPrem.
The second lever that creditors use in their credit extension policy is the capacity
of extended credit lines. This includes extending zero capacity credit lines to some
potential borrowers (i.e., doing borrower selection). The main idea is that at all
times, each creditor maintains an active set ASkt of borrowers that receive the bulk
of all borrowing capacity. Namely, the active set receives up to γ〈
∑
e∈Ind(k)t C(e)〉 .
Borrowers that have consistently low utilization drop out of the active set. Meanwhile,
a small budget is set aside to extend credit to an exploratory set ESkt of borrowers.
These are chosen randomly, and may enter the active set if they have a consistently




e∈Ind(k)t C(e)〉. The maximum size of the active set is a constant, environmental
parameter |ES|.
If it is within investment targets, the capacity of credit that the creditor extends
to the active set is 〈C(e)〉, which is the amount requested by the borrower during its





e∈Ind(k)t C(e)〉 then credit
capacities are normalized: C(e) = γ〈C(e)〉. All credit 〈
∑
e∈Ind(k)t C(e)〉 not invested
in ASkt is invested into credit lines for banks in ES
k
t , proportionately according to
their credit requests.
Before Gt is updated with new credit edges, banks record the debt principle and
interest that must be repaid in a matrix D≈.
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} :





Since the maturity of debt is always 1 period in our simulation, we then clear
Gt of all debt. This allows each bank to later choose between paying off its matured
debt and interest (if paid back using cash) or extending the debt if the updated Gt
affords enough credit (by paying using credit). Finally, Gt is updated with new credit
edges.
4.5.7 Capital update
Deposit shock A random amount of deposits are withdrawn or deposited into each
bank. Unlike asset returns, this is not a common shock. Rather, it is idiosyncratic
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for each bank, defined by a uniform distribution:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
∆kt ∼ wktU(−dt−1, dt−1) (4.14)
dkt ← dkt−1 + ∆kt (4.15)
If the shock ∆kt is positive, bank k receives ∆
k
t in cash. If the shock ∆
k
t is negative
and Pay(∆kt , k,Market) does not return a solution, so that the depositors’ withdrawal
is not satisfied, then bank k defaults. See Section 4.5.2 for details on default.
Asset payoff After investments are made, each bank k’s matured assetsAkt generate
a random payoff in period t+1 according to a lognormally distributed return factor
υt+1.
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
log pt ∼ N(µa, σ2a) (4.16)
mkt ← mkt−1 + Akt−1υt (4.17)
Interbank debt repayment Finally the interbank loan obligations encoded in
~Dt−1 are paid. These are loans generated on Gt−1 that are now matured and must
be repaid with interest.
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
Pay( ~Dt−1(i, j), i, j) (4.18)
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Again, if Pay( ~Dt−1(i, j), i, j) returns no solution, then bank i defaults.
4.5.8 Estimating returns




t , and σ
a
t .
They also need an estimate for βct and β
a
t , the funding costs for credit and assets
respectively. To obtain these, they monitor the state of the entire credit and asset
markets, since their individual performance in these markets is not stable from period
to period. Funding costs are recorded in real time, right as their associated payments
are made. The rest of these calculations are done right before investment targets are
set, after banks have already ended an iteration by purchasing assets and finalizing
their balance sheet.
Debt market As the performance of debt investments depends on an unpredictable
collection of decisions made by banks, all of µct , σ
c
t , and β
c
t are estimated from history.












C(e)V̂ ar[V alin(e)]1(τ(e) = Debt) (4.21)
Here DebtSumt captures the total funding spent on procuring debt investments.
DebtMuSumt captures the total expected returns on debt. DebtSigmaSumt captures
the volatility of returns on debt. There is randomness in that we do not know the
default status of borrowers. Thus, the expectations and variances of V alin are taken
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over the random Bernoulli variable indicating default.
In Equation 4.19, the second term represents uninvested cash that was reserved
for funding debt. Intuitively, it should be the case that when debt cannot be obtained
in exchange for cash, then the estimated return on debt should go down to reflect
scarcity. The way to think about this scenario is that the bank invested a portion
of its cash in debt, and a portion back into cash. Cash is an investment with sure
returns of zero, so it contributes nothing to DebtMuSumt and DebtSigmaSumt, but
is counted as utilized funding in DebtSum.
Some approximations are being made here. First, we do not know the true ex-
pectation or variance of debt returns because we do not have the true default rate
on debt. Ê is thus an approximate expectation, and V̂ ar is an approximate variance.
Since in general D̂R < DR, DebtMuSumt is overestimated. In addition, a major
assumption embedded in Equation 4.21 is that the return distributions for all debt
are mutually independent. This assumption tends to bias DebtSigmaSumt down-
wards (since in reality returns on debt are positively correlated due to a common
asset price shock and financial contagion), which decreases the variance estimate for
debt returns. Thus, debt tends to look over-attractive as an investment to banks.
To calculate the cost of funding for debt, observe that along a payment chain of
length L (i.e., consisting of L individual payments) in an EFCN consisting entirely
of credit edges, the Lth payment funds the L − 1st debt investment, the L − 1st
funds the L − 2nd, and so on up to the second payment funding the source’s issued
debt. Now consider a single debt cancellation in the middle of a payment path. The
receiver of the debt cancellation payment does not hold any new debt as a result of
the payment, so the next payment along the path should not count towards the cost
of funding debt. However, the payer of the debt cancellation is possibly funding debt
that was originated to it in the payment preceding the debt cancellation.
Suppose we have a payment P of amount X given by payment mechanism Pay,
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consisting of payment paths P (1), . . . , P (K). Each payment path may originate debt,
and we would like to know the funding cost of this debt so that we may include it in
our estimate of the debt market’s expected return. Recall that each P (k) consists of a




Let the total cost of funding debt during period t be CODt, and initialize
CODt = 0 every period. To update this given a single payment P , iterate through
each P (k) ∈ P . Let |P (k)| = L. Index the edges e ∈ P (k) in order using i ∈ {1, dots, L}
so that Receiver(ei) = Payer(ei+1). Now start with e1 and note its type τ(e1). Move
on to consider e2. If τ(e1) = debt, do nothing. Else, update CODt = CODt +
XValout(e2). Repeat for all pairs ei, ei+1, i ∈ {2, . . . , L − 1}. Note that the interest
rate used to calculate Valout is the realized interest rate specified by P . For borrowing,
this is the interest rate that will be paid by the borrower. For debt cancellation, this
is the interest rate on the cancelled debt. CODt is updated every time there is a
payment for any reason, as debt can be issued on any payment.











These parameters are used by all banks via a utility function optimization to make
investment decisions for the next period.
Asset market The asset return distribution is invariant over time so µat = µ
a and
σat = σ
a. The values of µa and σa are public information, and can be used directly by
banks. Meanwhile, the cost of funding used to buy assets varies over time depending
on how deposit shocks and the debt market play out. These dynamics are opaque to
banks, so historical data is used to estimate βat .
Every payment made for asset purchases is executed using the PayAsset payment
mechanism. This mechanism returns a payment P of amount X ′ = min(X,MF )
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where MF is the max flow from s to t and X is the amount requested by s. We
want to keep track of the sum of costs used to fund asset purchases , COAt.
In each period, initialize COAt = 0. Then for every payment made using PayAsset ,
do COAt = COAt +
∑
e∈P |Payer=sC(e)V alOut(e). Here, Valout is again using the
realized interest rates that PayAsset returns, which are the actual per-unit payment
costs to s.








Several of the model parameters are assumed to be fixed by a regulator. First,
the reserve rate mReserve for every bank is fixed. A maximum leverage ratio λmax
is also instituted for the unregulated settings.
Meanwhile, Basel regulation institutes a maximum leverage ratio λBt during period
t that takes a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of λmax. Basel regulates
based on the overall capital-weighted default rate of all banks, D̂R(allt). It is a




D̂R(allt) = 0 and λ
B
t = 1 when D̂R(allt) = crit.
4.6 Experiments and results
4.6.1 Basic properties of the credit cycle model
To illustrate how the credit cycle looks in practice, I first present aggregate results
showing the relationship between several key macroeconomic indicators. Note that
the figures in this section specify which profile and environment they are generated
with, but the qualitative features of each graph are invariant to these factors. I display
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just one example per graph type for viewability. Environmental settings are the same
as in the credit cycle game in Section 4.6.3.
A note on notation for this section: x%(0.2 0.0), (100− x)%(0.4 1.0) denotes the
mixed strategy profile with weight x/100 on θ = 0.2 and issuing unsecured debt,











Basel: 16% (0.2_0.0), 84% (0.2_1.0)













Basel: 16% (0.2_0.0), 84% (0.2_1.0)
Figure 4.3: Total debt as a function of interest rates weighted by debt amount.
As evidence that the debt market is working as intended, note the non-monotonic
relationship between interest rates and credit offered in Figure 4.2. This is indicative
















Basel 16% (0.2_0.0), 84% (0.2_1.0)
Figure 4.4: Estimated default rates weighted by debt amount as a function of capital.
credit premium) as well as default rate. When premiums increase, more creditors are
lured into providing credit lines as debt is seen as a more profitable investment. But
as estimated default rates increase, the perceived riskiness of debt increases and banks
are more reluctant to extend credit. The first effect dominates at low interest rates
and the second effect dominates at high rates. The fact that credit supply decreases
at the highest interest rates supports the credit cycle story, where banks withdraw
credit in times of high leverage.
Figure 4.3 shows that debt has the same non-monotonic relation with interest
rates that credit does. This shows that the credit supply is tracking the demand for
debt fairly well. Otherwise, increasing interest rates would lead to a decrease in debt
as banks choose to invest less in response.
Figure 4.4 shows that the estimated default rate of banks falls with the amount of
capital a bank has. But the estimated default rate is just a function of leverage, and
a bank’s target leverage should not vary with wealth. The explanation for this oddity
is that there is high inequality in size between banks. Banks with a large amount of
capital cannot execute high-leverage investment strategies because of a lack of credit
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Basel: 16% (0.2_0.0), 84% (0.2_1.0)





















Basel: 16% (0.2_0.0), 84% (0.2_1.0)
Figure 4.5: Top: default rates and estimated default rates for entire 80 epoch runs,
weighted by debt amount. Bottom: Estimated default rate as a function of default
rate weighted by debt amount.
leverage, and the healthier its balance sheet in the eyes of lenders.
Figure 4.5 shows that estimated default rates are extremely biased and fairly
noisy. Since these estimates correspond to the probability of a default due purely to
asset valuation fluctuations, we can surmise that the bias is due to financial contagion
pushing real default rates up.
4.6.2 Systemic risk measures
To evaluate the effect of Basel, we need to dictate which measures to use for
systemic risk. The first is default rate, which is calculated as the total number of
defaults divided by the total number of defaultable periods (i.e., a defaulted bank
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cannot default again during its ε period sojourn). The second is interest rate volatil-
ity, calculated as the standard deviation of average interest rate paid each period,
weighted by debt amount. Volatile interest rates lead to uncertainty about funding
availability, which poses a risk for banks. We also look at losses on debt due to
default. This is just an average of sums over each period. This tells us the direct
damage caused by default.
4.6.3 Credit cycle game
Experimental setup I run the model for T = 80 periods, with the following
parameters settings: N = 10, h = 1, ε = 7, winit = 10, dinit = 500, |DV | = 5 ,
µa = 0.05, σa = 0.2, mReserve = 0.3, UpPrem = 1.05,DownPrem = 0.9,UT = 0.95,
γ = 0.75, crit = 0.03. The strategy set available to banks was {(0.20), (0.21), (0.40),
(0.41), (0.60), (0.61)}. Both λmax = 40, where the maximum leverage allowed is 40
regardless of Basel regulations, and λmax = 10 are explored.
I present results from our main experiment evaluating Basel regulations. The key
takeaways are as follows:
1. Basel regulations taken as an external treatment decrease default rates, inter-
est rate volatility, and debt losses almost across the board in our examined
scenarios.
2. Profiles with smaller |~θ| and where less secured debt is offered are more dan-
gerous for financial stability (on default rates, debt losses, and interest rate
volatility).
3. Although Basel does not encourage strategic shifts towards less risky profiles,
in most cases it does not encourage riskier profiles either. The one exception
is the 52% 0.20.0, 48% 0.21.0 profile which is, by a thin margin, the riskiest
equilibrium seen in the λmax = 10 scenario.
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4. Basel tends to improve bank profit in riskier profiles, where the benefit to avoid-
ing crisis outweighs the additional leverage constraints.
It is quite surprising that Basel regulations are so effective while acting on ex-
tremely noisy and biased estimates of default rate. These estimates are quite useless
for giving an idea of actual systemic risk. However, because they are correlated with
the real default rate, a policy based on its fluctuations can effectively deter banks
from pursuing risky portfolios in times of high systemic leverage. The fact that the
estimated default rate is a leading indicator of upcoming defaults is good enough for
Basel to drastically decrease systemic risk. This finding puts to question the notion
that an accurate measure of network risk is necessary to control financial contagion.
Banks pursuing profit are heavily biased towards taking more risks. The benefit
to taking more risk is unbounded, while the cost of taking risk is limited to being
inactive for ε number of periods. This reflects the situation facing banks in the real
financial system, and underscores the need for effective regulation of risk.
Default Rate Interest Rate Volatility
Profile Basel Unregulated Profile Basel Unregulated
100% (0.2_0.0) 4.0% 8.0% 100% (0.2_0.0) 0.100 0.151
92.8% (0.2_1.0), 
7.2% (0.4_1.0) 3.8% 5.0%
92.8% (0.2_1.0), 
7.2% (0.4_1.0) 0.013 0.016
Capital Losses on Debt
Profile Basel Unregulated Profile Basel Unregulated
100% (0.2_0.0) 52,442 64,563 100% (0.2_0.0) 223 1019
92.8% (0.2_1.0), 
7.2% (0.4_1.0) 63,382 86,280
92.8% (0.2_1.0), 
7.2% (0.4_1.0) 66 133
Figure 4.6: Four systemic risk metrics evaluated at λmax = 40 for 10 funds. Analagous
table for λmax = 10 in Figure 4.7. Within a table, each row fixes an equilibrium mixed
strategy and applies a different regulatory setting, each column fixes a regulatory
setting and switches between different mixed strategy equilibrium. Green signifies
Basel setting/equilibrium profile, red signifies non-Basel, and blue signifies that the
profile appeared in equilibrium undeer both Basel and non-Basel settings.
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Default Rate Interest Rate Volatility
Profile Basel Unregulated Profile Basel Unregulated
4.63% (0.2_0.0), 
95.37% (0.2_1.0) 3.7% 4.5%
4.63% (0.2_0.0), 
95.37% (0.2_1.0) 0.025 0.032
52% (0.2_0.0), 
48% (0.2_1.0) 3.9% 7.3%
52% (0.2_0.0), 
48% (0.2_1.0) 0.019 0.078
100% (0.4_0.0) 1.0% 1.1% 100% (0.4_0.0) 0.047 0.051
16% (0.2_0.0), 
84% (0.2_1.0) 3.8% 4.7%
16% (0.2_0.0), 
84% (0.2_1.0) 0.028 0.052
Capital Losses on Debt
Profile Basel Unregulated Profile Basel Unregulated
4.63% (0.2_0.0), 
95.37% (0.2_1.0) 74,325 69,354
4.63% (0.2_0.0), 
95.37% (0.2_1.0) 200 368
52% (0.2_0.0), 
48% (0.2_1.0) 70,039 51,679
52% (0.2_0.0), 
48% (0.2_1.0) 168 896
100% (0.4_0.0) 21,505 39,428 100% (0.4_0.0) 52 29
16% (0.2_0.0), 
84% (0.2_1.0) 38,075 55,920
16% (0.2_0.0), 
84% (0.2_1.0) 177 435
Figure 4.7: Four systemic risk metrics evaluated at λmax = 10 for 10 funds. See
Figure 4.6 for key.
4.7 Summary
The model developed in this chapter captures a dynamic process of debt formation
at its most granular level. The network that evolves from this debt exhibits both credit
freeze and financial contagion endogenously. We find that Basel regulations inserted
into the model results in a much more stable financial system. While this seems to
encourage slightly more risky behavior from banks, who can rely on regulators to
limit them when they invest excessively, the overall effect of Basel is still positive.
This finding is surprising in light of the limited information on systemic risk available
to regulators. While there has been extensive interest in new network-based risk
measures, we found that in this complex network-based model, simple balance sheet
information was enough for Basel to reduce systemic risk. These findings supplement
those in Chapter II and paint Basel regulations as a useful regulation.
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CHAPTER V
Strategic adaptations by automobile firms to the
opening of a carbon emissions market
5.1 Introduction
In 1992, the UN established cap-and-trade as the standard regulatory approach to
achieve reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) [8]. This approach allocates pollution
rights to large-scale polluters according to a desired emissions cap. Polluters are then
permitted to trade these rights, thereby achieving a more efficient economic outcome.
Several studies commissioned at the time, as well as numerous subsequent studies,
found that this approach resulted in great cost savings as compared to a simple hard-
cap approach that does not allow the trading of pollution rights [48, 49].
One domain under the purview of GHG regulation is the vehicle market. The
auto market in the US alone represents hundreds of billions of dollars per year in
transactions, and environmental regulation has a significant impact on the vehicles
produced and sold. A technical challenge in analyzing this market is that vehicles are
differentiated products in the eyes of consumers, and the oligopolistic nature of the
industry means that each firm has individual pricing power. The demand for each
vehicle line depends not only on its own price, but on the price of every other vehicle.
In general these prices are set by different firms, resulting in profit functions that
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are strategically entwined. This is in contrast to the heavily studied power industry,
where the product (electricity) is homogeneous. There, the typical scenario has prices
that are fixed by an independent party that attempts to maximize social welfare [41].
In the vehicle market, prices are determined as a result of a game that firms play
with each other. This complicates the determination of the effects of cap-and-trade,
both on overall efficiency and the distribution of costs among firms and consumers.
The innovation in our approach is to cast the cost of pollution to firms as lost
opportunities to increase profit due to regulation. We model firms in a vehicle market
with many vehicle types. These firms are tied together by consumer demand, which
is modeled using a nested-logit form that combines a comprehensive set of vehicle fea-
tures. This demand model is the product of industrial research, born from the need to
make accurate predictions rather than to build analytical models. We compute strate-
gic equilibria among firms in the vehicle market through iterative best-response
(IBR), which is guaranteed to converge for several of the models that we compare.
Because our model allows explicit computation of strategic dynamics, we are able
to explore counterfactual scenarios such as alternative industrial organization, and
different regulation setups.
The market for trading pollution rights (or credits) introduces another level of
strategic behavior for firms, as they consider their utilization of credits to shape their
vehicle production, along with their bidding behavior in the market for credits. We
model the credits market as an iterative double auction mechanism. Equilibrium
analysis, or even best-response calculation, is not apparently feasible for the credits-
market behavior alone, let alone considering the coupling of credits allocation with
strategic behavior in the vehicle market. We therefore explore heuristic strategies
for credit trading, and employ empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), a
simulation-based game reasoning framework, to derive equilibrium behavior in this
heuristic strategy space.
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Our main contributions are twofold. First, we construct and solve novel models
for studying emissions trading in the vehicle market. Second, we produce economic
insights for this domain, most notably the finding that the welfare gained by moving
from hard-cap to cap-and-trade is disproportionately accrued by firms. In aggregate,
firm profits under the cap-and-trade regulation approach those of the unregulated
case, thanks to market segmentation opportunities created by emissions regulation.
In contrast, consumers absorb the brunt of costs through higher prices for polluting
vehicles. This effect is more pronounced with a less fragmented industrial organi-
zation. When firms use credit trading to manipulate their position in the vehicle
market, this effect is reduced slightly, as firms lose some credit trading volume due
to an inability to coordinate trades, and thus are not able to segment as efficiently.
5.1.1 Relation to prior work
The standard tool for analyzing cap-and trade emissions regulation is the marginal
abatement cost (MAC) curve [30]. At competitive equilibrium, the marginal cost for
abating one more unit of GHG pollution is the same for all firms—otherwise, firms
could gain from trading the right to pollute. This facilitates analysis of cap-and-
trade in the electric power industry [5, 9, 41], where firms lack pricing power and
therefore marginal costs directly determine equilibrium. Prior studies on vehicles
[37, 38] likewise apply MAC analysis in a non-strategic manner, by focusing on the
cost of improving vehicle efficiency. In our setting, the more relevant abatement cost
is foregone opportunity to sell profitable high-polluting vehicles, which calls for a
more explicitly strategic analysis.
Previous work has followed different approaches to estimate MAC curves for ve-
hicle markets. Firm behavior has been modeled as fixed and non-optimizing [23, 43],
as well as attempting to maximize fuel economy for consumers [56]. Our approach
models firms as strategic profit maximizers, and represents consumer utility using a
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demand function.
Studies using simple analytical models have examined the effect of industrial orga-
nization, specifically oligopoly, on emissions regulation [42, 57]. These models suggest
that oligopolies are detrimental to overall welfare outcomes under cap-and-trade reg-
ulation. We duplicate these results under a more complex model, and in addition find
that consumers bear the brunt of this welfare loss.
Strategic credit trading has been studied in experimental laboratory settings as
well as through stylized analytical models [28, 47, 68]. In general, prior studies have
found that when participants have market power in the emissions credit market, there
is a decrease in efficiency. We see the same in our study, with total welfare falling
when we allow strategic credit trading, but we find in addition that consumers benefit,
while firms make less profit.
This work adds to a growing library of AI research that seeks to uncover economic
insights using tools from computational game theory [35, 40, 53, 67].
5.1.2 Background
The US government regulates auto emissions primarily through two programs.
The CAFE program, administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, mandates corporate average fuel economy standards. The second program,
maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), directly regulates GHG
emissions. We focus exclusively on the EPA regulations, which broadly operate as
follows:
1. Each vehicle is assigned a real-numbered rating: negative for polluting, positive
for non-polluting.
2. Each firm’s annual credit balance , defined as sum of ratings weighted by sales
volume, must exceed zero.
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3. Positive balances may be carried forward into the next year.
4. Credits may be traded between firms within each year.
Due to a combination of technological, consumer-preference, and other economic fac-
tors, non-polluting vehicles tend to be much less profitable than polluting vehicles
such as SUVs and trucks. Acquiring credits allows a firm to produce a larger fraction
of more profitable vehicles.
5.1.3 Overview of models and assumptions
The regulation market cap-and-trade is implemented by opening a market in com-
pliance credits, secondary to the auto market itself. We are interested in understand-
ing the dynamics of the credits market, particularly to examine possible strategic
behavior by automakers, and how the special dynamics of this secondary market
affect the auto market.
For this purpose, we model four different environments:
1. Unregulated . This represents a world where the auto market operates without
constraint on emissions.
2. Hard-cap. This serves as a baseline model, where each firm must satisfy EPA
requirements individually, with no trading of compliance credits.
3. Credits trading with price takers . In this model we derive a single clearing
price for emission credits, under competitive (Walrasian) assumptions. These
assumptions are similar to the MAC models which dominate the literature.
4. Trading with strategic bidders . This model includes a concrete trading mech-
anism for compliance credits, where firms interact through a bidding process,
iterating between actions in the credits market and decisions about vehicle
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production. Including strategic bidding captures issues of market power and
dynamic information that are reflective of cap-and-trade in practice.
In each setting, the solution concept is Nash equilibrium with respect to the decision
variables in that setting.
We assume complete information in the vehicle market game; that is, each
firm knows the set of vehicles and costs of its competitors, and also has an accu-
rate consumer demand model. Though not exactly realistic, we believe this provides
a reasonable approximation. Real firms can make an educated guess of their com-
petitors’ costs using their own costs, and by observing equilibrium prices over time.
Furthermore, consumer demand models can be built using historic transaction data
available from commercial sources.
Another assumption we make is that the cost of producing vehicles, the consumer
demand for vehicles, and the way regulators assign credit balances do not change over
time. This assumption is not made because the methods in this chapter rely on it;
rather, we do this mainly for convenience as we do not have the information required
to forecast these quantities. If forecasts were provided, the analysis could be updated
without any model changes.
Finally, we assume that firms do not price their vehicles below cost. This as-
sumption is salient for non-polluting vehicles whose production generates emissions
credits that could be sold. We make this assumption mainly as a reasonable baseline
expectation for firm behavior. Our models and methodology do not depend on this
assumption, and only the empirical results are affected by it.
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5.2 A model of auto emissions trading
5.2.1 Notation
Consider a set of m products , denoted V = {v1, . . . , vm}. These products are
sold in each of T time periods. Each product is produced by a single firm from set
F = {f1, . . . , fn} where |F | = n. The firm producing a particular product is given
by function f : V → F . The products produced by firm i are denoted Vi ⊂ V . The
set of indices corresponding to Vi are Ii ⊂ {1, . . . ,m}. Product prices , which are
set by their producers, are given by vector Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ∈ Rm. The demand
function φ : Ψ ∈ Rm → Rm returns the quantity of each product that is sold to
a mass of consumers given Ψ. Costs , which are fixed and given per marginal unit
of production, are denoted Σ = {σ1, . . . , σm}. Regulation credits are assigned
according to a function κ : φ(Ψ) ∈ Rm → Rn. Roughly speaking, these are non-
negative for production mixes that achieve a regulatory goal, and negative otherwise.
For convenience, we use Vj to denote a vector selecting V ’s elements with indices
Ij. V−j denotes a vector selecting elements of V with indices from the complement
of Ij. It is understood that the union operation, ∪, preserves indices such that, for
example, Σ−j∪Σj = Σ. To select a particular element of vector V with index i, we use
V(i). We use superscripts to denote an instantiation of a vector. These instantiations
can be of functions or vectors. So for period t, Ψtj is the vector of product prices
actually set by firm j. Meanwhile, κtj is equivalent to κ(φ(Ψ
t
j)). This is the actual
amount of regulation credits assigned to firm j in time t.
To denote elements of a function that are given, we use the | symbol in the following
way: F (x) | y,G = x + G(y) means that x is a variable, G is a given function, and
y is fixed value. It should be clear from context whether functions or constants are
being given.
Finally, let θtj denote credits retained without being sold (by firm j). These
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Figure 5.1: Profit generation process.
credits will roll over into the next period, t + 1, and must be non-negative because
deficits cannot be rolled over. And, let λtj denote credit obligations held by firm j
at time t. Negative λtj means obligations owed (sold) while positive means obligations
held (purchased).
5.2.2 The vehicle market model
We model the vehicle market as a Bertrand pricing game, for n multi-product
firms with differentiated products. Firm j at time t strategizes over the prices it
controls (each element of Ψtj). The profit for firm j made by selling cars at time t is
fully determined given a set of vehicle prices {
⋃
Ψt, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}}, as follows.
Πcarsj (Ψ
1, . . . ,ΨT ) | Σj, φ =
T∑
t=1
[Ψtj − Σj]′φtj. (5.1)
The demand function φ is a consumer choice model with (nested) logit demand,
loosely based on real industry data. Naturally, vehicles in this model are gross
substitutes (increasing the price of a product can only increase the demand for
other products). We assume throughout that φ is known to all firms.
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5.2.3 Unregulated vehicle market
In the unregulated vehicle market, firms set prices in an attempt to maximize
Πcarsj . In Equation 5.1, every component of firm payoffs is constant over time. This
means that firms treat each period independently and equivalently. Their decision on
price is independent of T . Call this constant decision Ψ0. Then the payoff function
can be reduced to
ΠUj (Ψ
0) | Σj, φ = T × [Ψ0j − Σj]′φ0j .
We can now define a Nash equilibrium for the pricing game in the unregulated
market.
Definition V.1 (Unregulated price equilibrium). A set of prices Ψ∗ is an unregulated
price equilibrium if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
ΠUj (Ψ
∗) | Σj, φ ≥ ΠUj (Ψj ∪Ψ∗−j) | Σj, φ,∀Ψj ∈ R|Ij |.
Our simulations find Nash Equilibrium in this market using IBR - simulating each
automaker’s optimal response to the current prices of other automakers. In general
games, IBR might not converge, and would instead cycle forever. However, since the
game model we employ is a Bertrand pricing game with logit demand model and
linear cost function, we can show that IBR converges.
Theorem V.2 (Convergence of Iterative Best Response). IBR on the market de-
scribed above converges to a unique (unregulated) price equilibrium. [44]
5.2.4 Emissions regulation: Hard-cap
Under hard-cap emissions regulation, firms need to satisfy a cap on emissions per
vehicle while maximizing vehicle profits. Again letting Ψ0 be the firms’ constant
decision, this leads to a constrained profit function in the following form.
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Πcapj (Ψ
0) | Σj, φ, κ =

−∞, if κ0j < 0
T × [Ψ0j − Σj]′φ0j , otherwise
Recall that κ0j is the overall amount of emissions credits assigned to firm j by
regulators based on its vehicle sales, and is a weighted sum of φ0j where the coefficients
are the EPA rating for each vehicle. We can now define Nash equilibrium.
Definition V.3 (Hard-cap price equilibrium). A set of prices Ψ∗ is a hard-cap price
equilibrium if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Πcapj (Ψ
∗) | Σj, φ, κ ≥ Πcapj (Ψj ∪Ψ∗−j) | Σj, φ, κ,
∀Ψj ∈ R|Ij |.
Although the hard-cap breaks the linearity of the cost function, we can still show
(by employing results by [65, 66]) that this market maintains the same useful property
of the unregulated case.
Theorem V.4 (Convergence of iterative best response under hard cap). IBR on the
market described above converges to a unique (hard-cap) price equilibrium.
5.2.5 A price-takers emissions credits market
In an effort to allow firms to meet regulatory constraints as efficiently as possible,
credits can be traded on a credits market . This is intended to incentivize firms
that have a lower cost for producing credits to take on more of the burden.
In the price-takers market, firms maximize the following profit function.
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ΠWj (Ψ
0)|Σj, φ,Ω, κ = 
−∞, if κ0j + λ0j < 0
T × [Ψ0j − Σj]′φ0j + Ωλ0j , otherwise
Recall that λ0j is the number of credit obligations bought or sold. These are
credits that transfer hands from a firm who produces them by producing non-polluting
vehicles, to a firm who needs them to satisfy regulatory requirements.
There are two key assumptions embedded in this payoff function. First, firms take
credits prices as given externally. Second, firms do not attempt to manipulate the
credits market by retaining credits for the next period, as is allowed by regulation.
We will loosen both of these assumptions in our strategic credit trading model.
We can specify a Nash equilibrium given this payoff function. Note that although
λ0j is a choice made by firms, it is determined mechanically given Ψ
0
j via the constraint
κ0j + λ
0
j < 0. Thus, λ
0
j is not a strategic variable.
Definition V.5 (Price taker’s credit market equilibrium). A set of prices Ψ∗ is a
price taker’s credit market equilibrium if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},Ψj ∈ R|Ij |:
ΠWj (Ψ
∗)|Σj, φ, κ,Ω ≥ ΠWj (Ψj ∪Ψ∗−j) | Σj, φ, κ,Ω.
The convergence result of Iterative Best Response can easily be extended to this
setting by adding the cost of compliance to the cost of each vehicle.
Theorem V.6 (Convergence of iterative best response under credit market price).
IBR on the market described above converges to a (credit market) equilibrium.
Firms in this setting assume they will be able to buy and sell λ0j credits without
considering who their trading partner will be. In reality, these trades are not all
feasible, as setting a particular Ω will usually induce a shortage or surplus in the
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credits market. So the price taker’s Nash equilibrium is only feasible if a market
clearing condition holds:
Definition V.7 (Walrasian credit equilibrium). A tuple (Ψ∗,Ω) is a Walrasian credit
equilibrium if Ψ∗ is a Price taker’s credit market equilibrium, and in addition the
following condition holds: ∑
j∈{1,...,n}
λ∗j = 0
With credits in hand, a firm has the flexibility to produce more polluting vehicles
and earn more profit. By selling credits, a firm has constrained itself to losing profits
in the vehicle market since it must produce enough non-polluting vehicles to honor the
sale. At a Walrasian credit equilibrium, buyers have determined that their collective
profit gain per credit in the Bertrand pricing game from buying a set number of
credits is equal to the given price of credits. Similarly, the collective profit loss per
credit experienced by sellers by selling a set number of credits is equal to the given
price of credits. Thus, the price of credits is analogous to the cost of abatement, and
the market clearing condition is analogous to equality of marginal costs of abatement
across firms.
5.3 Strategic behavior in the emissions market
The assumption that firms are strictly price takers in the credits market is a
simplification of reality. Firms have an incentive to buy and sell credits at prices
favorable to themselves, and they have different levels of bargaining power to achieve
those prices. In the strategic emissions market, we allow firms to play out this bar-
gaining process using heuristic strategies while trying to maximize estimated profit
from both credit obligation transactions as well as the vehicle market.
The mechanism for exchanging credits is a single price multi-unit double auction.
Firms submit (price, quantity) bids to either sell or buy credits. After all bids clear,
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firms observe the outcome of their bids and submit a new round of bids. This process
iterates until a fixed horizon is reached. This mechanism does nothing to ensure truth
telling, and rich strategic behavior is expected.
Firms in this model strategize over two bidding parameters: χj, an impatience
parameter , and µj, a shading parameter . Roughly speaking, χj corresponds to
a bid pricing strategy, while µj corresponds to a bid quantity strategy. A baseline
bidding strategy for each firm is to offer around the historically observed market price
of credits at a quantity given by the amount of credits transacted at the associated
price taker’s credit market equilibrium. This strategy, utilized by choosing a large µj
and large χj, signifies a firm’s willingness to be a price taker.
Firms choose their bidding parameters strategically by observing an overall payoff,
generated as follows. First, firms submit bids in the credit market. They observe the
resulting clearing price and execute any bids that have been matched. They then
adjust their bids based on this information, and submit them to the double auction
again. They do this for ν bidding iterations , coming away with either positive or
negative revenue and, correspondingly, a negative or positive credits balance. Using
what they have observed in the credits market, they form a belief about what the
future credits price is. Armed with their actual credit balance and their estimated
credit price, they enter the vehicle market where iterated best response runs and
converges. They then carry forward any unused credits into the next period, and
repeat the process. The total number of periods is an environment setting, called
T . The total payoff is the sum of all credit revenues added to the sum of all vehicle
profits.
We need to simulate payoffs for many strategy profiles before being able to find
a Nash equilibrium in χ and µ. To do this search, we use empirical game-theoretic
analysis, which is a tool for sampling payoffs intelligently [10].
The purpose of this model is not to incorporate every possible bidding strategy,
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but to complement our price-takers credit market analysis. By allowing firms to
exercise market power to some degree, we address a gap in our analysis of the credit
market for vehicles, since we know that, in reality, there are firms who can bargain
successfully. For a deeper, reproducible explanation of the strategic credit trading
model, see the s upplemental materials1.
5.4 Experiments and results
5.4.1 Scenarios and setup
The baseline scenario in our experiments has n = 3 and m = 14. φ, Σ,
and κ are given by our industry sponsor and are based on real data and government
guidance. Each firm can produce a mix of emissions credit generating (mostly electric)
vehicles and credit consuming (gas) vehicles, at different profitability levels. Firm 1
can produce credit generating vehicles at a lower cost than the others, and will be
the seller in the credits market. The other two firms produce highly profitable gas
vehicles, and will be buyers in the credits market. Unlike firms 1 and 2, firm 3 does
not produce trucks, and produces a much smaller total number of vehicles than the
other two.
Two other scenarios examine how extreme types of industrial organization affect
the model. The first scenario is a monopoly scenario, where all products are
produced by a single firm (n = 1,m = 14). The second scenario is a fragmented
scenario, where every product is produced by a different firm (n = 14, m = 14).
Although the ownership relation from firms to vehicles changes, we keep φ, Σ, and κ
constant throughout.
For the strategic credit market model, we examine two settings. First, we set
T = 4 and ν = 20. We call this model setting strategic credits (long). The
1https://www.dropbox.com/s/a2dfjzkfp25ppgv/ijcai2019_supplemental.pdf?dl=0
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Figure 5.2: Aggregate welfare in millions. Profit in green followed by consumer surplus
in red followed by total welfare in blue.
other strategic model setting, strategic credits (short), has T = 5 and ν = 10.
The firms in strategic credits models draw bidding strategy (µj, χj) from the set
(χ, µ)|χ ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.999}, µ ∈ {0.01, 0.4, 0.7}.
5.4.2 Evaluating welfare
The measure of value we use to judge equilibria is total welfare . Welfare in our
case is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profit. We do not attempt
to quantify the benefit to the environment, assuming that emissions regulation is doing
its job.
Consumer surplus is a measure of the total savings that consumers get from buying
vehicles at an equilibrium price. Given a set of equilibrium prices Ψ∗, consumer






Total consumer surplus is
∑m
i=1 γi. In general, consumer surplus decreases with
higher equilibrium prices. Calculation is done via numerical integration.
Welfare results are shown in Figure 5.2. Omitted entries for the monopoly row
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were due to the impossibility of trading with oneself. Instead, since the monopoly
controls all vehicle markets, it generates credits in fuel-efficient segments for use in
fuel inefficient ones. Thus, the hard-cap model for monopoly is comparable to the
credit trading models for other scenarios.
Omitted entries in the competitive setting were due to computational constraints.
Since none of these games are symmetric, expanding to 14 firms using the full strategy
set requires evaluating payoffs for 1214 = 1.28e+15 profiles.
We call attention to several phenomena in Figure 5.2:
1. Monopoly profit is higher than all other scenarios in the unregulated model.
In addition, monopoly profit under the hard-cap scenario beats profit under all
other regulated scenarios. Both of these results are expected, as monopolies can
coordinate between the different vehicle markets more efficiently, both to avoid
cannibalization and to navigate regulatory requirements.
2. The credits market allows firms to collectively achieve a near-monopolistic profit
level under regulation. The hard-cap monopoly beats the regulated credit trad-
ing scenarios by much less than the unregulated monopoly beats all other un-
regulated scenarios.
3. In the baseline and fragmented scenarios, credit trading results in profit levels at
or above those of the unregulated model. Meanwhile, consumer surplus always
decreases greatly when regulation with credit trading is applied. Consumers are
hurt more than firms by emissions regulation. This effect is least pronounced
(though still significant) in the fragmented scenario out of all scenarios.
4. Strategic bidding decreases profits and raises consumer surplus slightly.
The overarching theme is that when credit trading is introduced, firms are able
to offset and even overturn losses due to hard-cap emissions constraints by raising
prices in tandem. Consumer surplus suffers as a result.
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It is the unique industrial organization in the baseline scenario that allows firms to
maintain high prices and profits, given the ability to trade credits. Namely, each firm
has a very diverse set of vehicles. This allows each firm to strategically exit and enter
certain markets based on their credit costs. Compared to the unregulated scenario,
firm 1, which must maintain a high credits balance in the credit markets trading
scenario, abandons high-pollution trucks. Firm 2, which can buy low-cost credits
from firm 1, abandons low-pollution cars. This segmentation gets rid of competitive
forces within each vehicle type’s market and keeps prices high.
This is in contrast to the fragmented scenario, where firms do not have the option
of exiting a vehicle segment. Thus, competitive forces are maintained in each vehicle
segment, and consumer surplus is highest in this scenario out of all regulated scenarios.
Profit is actually almost at monopoly levels as well. This is because of the firms
producing polluting vehicles; the most cost-efficient firms become more dominant, as
they can afford to pay for more credits at the same vehicle price. They do this because
they know that they can maintain margins even with the credit price factored in. This
efficiency results in the highest total welfare out of any regulated scenario. Overall,
we find that a more fragmented industrial organization is beneficial to cap-and-trade
regulation.
5.4.3 Strategic credit trading analysis
The shift from greater profits to greater consumer surplus in the strategic trading
case stems from the fact that fewer credits are traded. Figure 5.4 shows how profit
and credit market activity varies among firms, compared to the Walrasian equilibrium
baseline. In all cases, fewer credits are traded in the strategic case. The one exception
is for Firm 3 in the “long” model, where the credit balance is similar to the Walrasian
case. Both large firms (1 and 2) suffer profit losses, while the smaller firm 3 comes out
ahead. For an analogous table for the “short” setting, see the supplemental materials.
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μ* χ* μ* χ*
Firm 1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.4
Firm 2 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.4
Firm 3 0.9 0.01 0.7 0.7
ν = 20, T = 4 ν = 10, T = 5
Figure 5.3: Nash equilibrium bidding parameters
Firm Vehicle Profit Total Profit Absolute Credits Balance Average Credit Price
1 -2.83% -4.16% -4.26% -1.41%
2 -8.53% -9.74% -5.09% -1.54%
3 3.28% 4.85% -0.69% -0.87%
Figure 5.4: Aggregate changes in strategic trading (long) baseline vehicle market as
a percentage from Walrasian model.
The root cause of this is the large amount of shading applied at equilibrium (see
Figure 5.3). The two large firms are engaged in restricting credits volume for fear
of the credit price moving against them if they yield. Thus, they both shade to the
maximum level. This leads them to compete with each other in the vehicle market,
as firm 1 owes less credit obligations, so can sell more polluting vehicles. A secondary
effect is that firm 2 focuses on selling its most profitable polluting vehicle, trucks,
since it has limited access to pollution credits. This creates an opening for firm 3,
who chooses to shade less in order to buy more credits and sell more SUVs. Overall,
there is less segmentation of the market between the two large firms, resulting in a
transfer of welfare from firms to consumers. For evidence of this summary of results
at the vehicle level, see the supplemental materials.
The biggest welfare effect of the strategic maneuvering in the credits market is
more competition in the truck sector in the (long) model. Since firm 3 has a relatively
large quantity of credits, it focuses on selling SUVs, crowding the other two firms out
into the truck market. The subsequent price war transfers welfare from firms to
consumers.
5.5 Policy implications
By analyzing how firms adapt strategically to emissions regulation, we gain insight
into the question: Who pays for emissions reduction in the US vehicles market?
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The answer is, resoundingly, that consumers pay as firms segment themselves by
vehicle type and raise prices to protect themselves against production constraints.
Trading emissions credits provides a remarkably efficient way for firms to preserve
profits, as even a monopoly facing emissions regulation cannot do appreciably better.
Strategic trading provides some relief to consumers, as firms tend to limit credits
trading volume and thus compete more. But with this redistribution of welfare comes
some deadweight loss. The best way we have found to bring consumer surplus up,
and with it, overall welfare, is to fragment the production of vehicles so that no firm
has an incentive to focus on one vehicle at the expense of another. Our results suggest
that cap-and-trade is definitely an improvement over a hard cap, but that caution





In this thesis I have evaluated new and upcoming regulations in two of the largest
and most complex markets in the United States: the financial market and the au-
tomobile market. The financial markets consist of two main traded products: debt
and assets. Basel regulations changed how both of these markets work by imposing
stricter, procyclical leverage requirements. I take an existing model of asset market
dynamics with a fixed supply of debt, and show how the strategic adaptation of banks
to Basel changes systemic risk measures. These changes are enough to overturn the
finding from the study in which the model was originally developed that Basel is
destabilizing in asset market.
I then turn to examine the market for debt. An important feature of the debt
market is that there are as many types of debt as pairs of agents, and possibly
more. These many types of debt form a network through which banks impact each
other, unlike the monolithic asset market where they can only impact each other
through price movements. Being able to model the full network of debt is important
in order to account for phenomena seen during the last crisis, such as credit freeze and
financial contagion. As no existing model has the ability to do this, I build my own. I
start with specifying EFCNs, a framework for writing down debt and credit networks
and making payments on them. I then use EFCNs to build a behavioral model
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for profit-seeking banks that dynamically updates an EFCN in response to market
conditions. I use this model to evaluate Basel regulations, finding that it performs
well at reducing instability by using only balance sheet data, despite the fact that deep
network insights (such as the exposure of each bank to potential financial contagion)
are completely hidden to this type of data.
In the automobile market, I evaluate the impact of emissions regulations that allow
the trading of emissions credits. I find that the credits market becomes a platform
for firms to maintain profits through price increases. Thus, the majority of the cost
of implementing an emissions cap falls on consumers.
Beyond the economic findings, I have also demonstrated that EGTA is a power-
ful tool in the analysis of agent-based models. Without the ability to solve for an
equilibrium, agent-based models can often come to a variety of conclusions depend-
ing on how agent behavior is fixed. This is especially true if agents are permitted
to execute complex strategies as the range of outcomes of the model becomes quite
diverse. EGTA allows agent-based models to be principled in selecting among model
outcomes: following an equilibrium profile rather than an arbitrarily chosen one.
As mentioned in the introduction, EFCNs offer a rich opportunity for further
modeling of the banking system. A more complex asset market where banks influence
each other through their decisions on asset purchases would help connect the model to
a large branch of asset market-based research such as the works based on the leverage
cycle. Banks with shared equity stakes might behave quite differently when deciding
how much to invest.
The economic findings in this thesis reproduce qualitative observations (such as
financial contagion in the 2008 crisis and lack of price decreases following EPA cap-
and-trade regulations), but no attempt has been made to match quantitative data.
This shortcoming could be addressed given access to the right data sources, and would
help sharpen findings to be more relevant to policy-making. The scenarios evaluated
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experimentally in this thesis are chosen using common sense, an approach which could
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[21] Erdős, P. and Rényi, A. (1959). On random graphs. Publicationes Mathematicae
Debrecen, 6:290–297.
[22] Even, S., Itai, A., and Shamir, A. (1975). On the complexity of time table and
multi-commodity flow problems. In 16th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, pages 184–193.
[23] Fullerton, D. and Gan, L. (2005). Cost-effective policies to reduce vehicle emis-
sions. American Economic Review, 95(2):300–304.
[24] Geanakoplos, J. (2003). Liquidity, default, and crashes: Endogenous contracts
in general equilibrium. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and
Applications, Eighth World Congress, volume 2, pages 170–205. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
141
[25] Geanakoplos, J. (2010). The leverage cycle. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
volume 24, pages 1–65. University of Chicago Press.
[26] Geanakoplos, J., Axtell, R., Farmer, J. D., Howitt, P., Conlee, B., Goldstein,
J., Hendrey, M., Palmer, N. M., and Yang, C.-Y. (2012). Getting at systemic
risk via an agent-based model of the housing market. American Economic Review,
102(3):53–58.
[27] Ghosh, A., Mahdian, M., Reeves, D. M., Pennock, D. M., and Fugger, R. (2007).
Mechanism design on trust networks. In Third International Workshop on Internet
and Network Economics, pages 257–268.
[28] Godby, R. (2002). Market power in laboratory emission permit markets. Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics, 23(3):279–318.
[29] Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012). Securitized banking and the run on repo.
Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3):425 – 451. Market Institutions, Financial
Market Risks and Financial Crisis.
[30] Goulder, L. H. (2013). Markets for pollution allowances: What are the (new)
lessons? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1):87–102.
[31] Healy, P. M. and Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate dis-
closure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1):405–440.
[32] ILOG (2007). CPLEX 11.0 user’s manual. Technical report, ILOG SA, Gentilly,
France.
[33] Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D. (2010a). Bank lending during the financial crisis
of 2008. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3):319–338.
[34] Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D. (2010b). Bank lending during the financial crisis
of 2008. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3):319 – 338. The 2007-8 financial
crisis: Lessons from corporate finance.
[35] Jordan, P. R., Kiekintveld, C., and Wellman, M. P. (2007). Empirical game-
theoretic analysis of the tac supply chain game. In Proceedings of the 6th Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
’07, pages 193:1–193:8, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
[36] Karlan, D., Mobius, M., Rosenblat, T., and Szeidl, A. (2009). Trust and social
collateral. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3):1307–1361.
[37] Karplus, V. J., Paltsev, S., and Reilly, J. M. (2010). Prospects for plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles in the united states and japan: A general equilibrium analysis.
Transportation Research Part A: Policy & Practice, 44(8):620 – 641.
142
[38] Kesicki, F. (2012). Intertemporal issues and marginal abatement costs in the
uk transport sector. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment,
17(5):418 – 426.
[39] Leyveld, S. P., Sa, F., Vause, N., Webber, L., Willison, M., et al. Andrew g
haldane: Rethinking the financial network.
[40] Li, Z. and Das, S. (2016). An agent-based model of competition between finan-
cial exchanges: Can frequent call mechanisms drive trade away from cdas? In
Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multi-
agent Systems, AAMAS ’16, pages 50–58, Richland, SC. International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[41] Limpaitoon, T., Chen, Y., and Oren, S. S. (2011). The impact of carbon cap and
trade regulation on congested electricity market equilibrium. Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 40(3):237–260.
[42] Malueg, D. A. (1990). Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs.
Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, 18(1):66 – 77.
[43] Mannering, F. and Winston, C. (1985). A dynamic empirical analysis of house-
hold vehicle ownership and utilization. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(2):215–
236.
[44] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990). Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium
in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica, 58(6):1255–1277.
[45] Mislove, A., Post, A., Druschel, P., and Gummadi, K. P. (2008). Ostra: Lever-
aging trust to thwart unwanted communication. In Fifth Usenix Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation, pages 15–30.
[46] Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Maffei, M., and Pecina, K. (2015). Privacy pre-
serving payments in credit networks. In Network and Distributed Security Sympo-
sium.
[47] Muller, R. A., Mestelman, S., Spraggon, J., and Godby, R. (2002). Can double
auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, 44(1):70 – 92.
[48] Ogden, D. C. (1966). Economic analysis of air pollution. Land Economics,
42(2):137–147.
[49] Perl, L. J. and Dunbar, F. C. (1982). Cost effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis
of air quality regulations. American Economic Review, 72(2):208–213.
[50] Poledna, S., Molina-Borboa, J. L., Mart́ınez-Jaramillo, S., van der Leij, M.,
and Thurner, S. (2015). The multi-layer network nature of systemic risk and its
implications for the costs of financial crises. Journal of Financial Stability, 20:70–
81.
143
[51] Poledna, S. and Thurner, S. (2016). Elimination of systemic risk in financial
networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax. Quantitative Finance,
16(10):1599–1613.
[52] Poledna, S., Thurner, S., Farmer, J. D., and Geanakoplos, J. (2014). Leverage-
induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 42:199–212.
[53] Reddy, P. P. and Veloso, M. M. (2011). Learned behaviors of multiple au-
tonomous agents in smart grid markets. In Twenty-fifth AAAI conference on Ar-
tificial intelligence.
[54] Resnick, P. and Zeckhauser, R. (2002). Trust among strangers in Internet trans-
actions: Empirical analysis of eBay’s reputation system. In Baye, M. R., editor,
The Economics of the Internet and E-Commerce. Elsevier.
[55] Roberts, M. R. and Sufi, A. (2009). Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evi-
dence from private credit agreements. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2):159–
184.
[56] Rubin, J., Leiby, P. N., and Greene, D. L. (2009). Tradable fuel economy credits:
Competition and oligopoly. Journal of Environmental Economics & Management,
58(3):315 – 328.
[57] Sartzetakis, E. S. (1997). Tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence
of imperfectly competitive product markets: Welfare implications. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 9(1):65–81.
[58] Schuldenzucker, S., Seuken, S., and Battiston, S. (2016). Clearing payments in
financial networks with credit default swaps [extended abstract]. In 17th ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’16, pages 759–759, New York,
NY, USA. ACM.
[59] Schuster, P. and Sigmund, K. (1983). Replicator dynamics. Journal of theoretical
biology, 100(3):533–538.
[60] Serfozo, R. (2009). Basics of Applied Stochastic Processes. Probability and Its
Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[61] Shaffer, L. (2016). Debt is holding back the global economic recovery, say central
bankers dudley, rajan and zeti. CNBC.
[62] Shiller, R. J. (2015). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press.
[63] Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (2010). Unstable banking. Journal of Financial
Economics, 97(3):306 – 318. The 2007-8 financial crisis: Lessons from corporate
finance.
144
[64] Thurner, S., Farmer, J. D., and Geanakoplos, J. (2012). Leverage causes fat tails
and clustered volatility. Quantitative Finance, 12(5):695–707.
[65] Vives, X. (1990). Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 19(3):305 – 321.
[66] Vives, X. (2005). Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to
industrial organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(7):625
– 637.
[67] Wah, E. and Wellman, M. P. (2013). Latency arbitrage, market fragmentation,
and efficiency: A two-market model. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Con-
ference on Electronic Commerce, EC ’13, pages 855–872, New York, NY, USA.
ACM.
[68] Westskog, H. (1996). Market power in a system of tradeable carbon dioxide
quotas. Energy Journal, 17:85–104.
[69] Wiedenbeck, B., Cassell, B.-A., and Wellman, M. P. (2014). Bootstrap statistics
for empirical games. In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, pages 597–604.
[70] Wiedenbeck, B. and Wellman, M. P. (2012a). Scaling simulation-based game
analysis through deviation-preserving reduction. In 11th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 931–938.
[71] Wiedenbeck, B. and Wellman, M. P. (2012b). Scaling simulation-based game
analysis through deviation-preserving reduction. In 11th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pages 931–938.
[72] Yu, Y. and Shen, M. (2016). Consumer protection as the ‘open sesame’ that
allows Alibaba to crush the forty thieves. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement.
145
